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1.  Objectives  and  main  conclusions 
As  announced  in  its  1985  work  programme,  the  Commission  has 
decided,  in  response  to  the  wish  expressed  by  the  European 
Council  of  28  March  1984  in  Brussels,  to  consider  ways  of 
providing  the  Community  with  better  industrial structures  in 
order  to  improve  its economic  performance  and  offer  a  more 
effective  response  to  social  and  employment  concerns. 
This  Communication  therefore  forms  part  of  a  general  process 
of  reflection  on  the  Community's  economic  and  social 
strategy,  which  began  with  the  work  on  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  <1  >,  the  strengthening  of  the  technological 
base  <2>  and  the  implementation  of  a  concerted  strategy 
for  growth  and  employment  <3>,  and  which  will  go  on  to 
include  a  detailed  analysis  of  a  social  and  job  creation 
strategy  for  the  Community. 
Industrial  competitiveness  is  a  complex  concept,  but  is is 
normally  taken  t~  cover  the  ability  of  firms  to  face  up  to 
their competitors  on  domestic  and  world  markets.  At  world 
market  level  this ability does  not  only  depend  on  the 
capacity  to  produce  at  costs  which  enable  the  products  in 
question  to  be  sold  at  a  profit;  there  is also  a  dynamic 
aspect,  to  it,  namely,  the  ability to  keep  abreast  of,  and 
even  to  influence,  the  processes  of  adaptation  so  as  to 
supply  the  range  of  products  for  which  demand  is  most 
dynamic.  Any  worsening  of  the  competitive  situation of 
European  industry will,  by  definition,  have  adverse  effects 
on  growth  and  employment. 
The  strategy  outlined  in  the  Commission's  annual  economic 
report,  the  aim  of  which  is to  introduce  more  vigorous 
growth  which  creates  more  jobs,  fits  in  well  with  the  need 
to  make  European  industry  more  competitive.  This  is because 
stronger  growth  makes  the  adjustment  of  structures easier 
and  is based  on  an  improvement  in  investment  profitability, 
two  factors  which  are  crucial  to  the  development  of 
competitiveness. 
In  this  document,  the  Commission  has  endeavoured  to  identify 
the  key  elements  ~hich determine  the  Community's 
competitiveness  and  the  factors  likely to  assist  its 
improvement,  namely 
<1  >  COM<85)310  final  :  Completing  the  internal  market 
<2>  COM<85)84  and  COM<85)530  final  :  Towards  a  European 
Technology  Community 
<3>  COM<85)570  final  :  Annual  Economic  Report  1985-86 
1 - on  the  one  hand,  the  position  and  the  specific 
characteristics of  the  Community  industries  in  an 
international  context  both  in  terms  of  general  economic 
factors  and  in  terms  of  technology  and  business  performance, 
with  particular attention being  paid  to  SMEs;  and 
- on  the  other  hand  the  strategies  employed  by  its main 
trading  partners.  Celarly,  what  is said  here  about  those 
strategies  is not  meant  to  imply  that  they  are  an  example  to 
be  followed,  firstly  because  they  are  not  transferable  and 
also,  more  importantly,  because  they  do  not  necessarily 
correspond  to  the  Community's  own  objectives  and  in 
particular to  its concern  to  reconcile  the  striving for 
economic  efficiency  with  maintaining  and  developing  social 
progress. 
Naturally,  a  number  of  the  factors  that  determine  industrial 
competitiveness  have  major  social  implications.  That  is  why 
the  Commission  is at  pains  to  emphasize  the  benefit  to  the 
Community  of  a  cooperation  strategy  based  on  a  concerted 
approach  to  the  problems  by  the  two  sides  of  industry,  trade 
unions  and  firms'  representatives,  the  Member  States  and  the 
Community  institutions. 
The  Commission  believes that,  this  is the  approach  that  must 
be  adopted,  towards  making  European  firms  more  competitive 
if growth  and  employment  are  to  be  improved. 
Its purpose  in  this  communication  is  to  provide  all  the 
parties  concerned  with  a  basis  for  discussion  from  which 
operational  proposals  can  emerge.  The  ideas  set  out  in this 
document  must  not  therefore  be  construed  as  either 
recommendations  or  as  representing  the  definitive position 
of  the  Commission,  but  simply  as  arguments  designed  to 
provide  substance  for  a  dialogue  which  are  susceptible  of 
improvement  in  the  process. 
The  conclusions  of  this analysis  can  be  summarized  as 
follows  : 
a>  Though  operating  in  an  extremely  tight  international 
context,  industry  in  the  Community  : 
has  given  a  very  mixed  performance,  generally  holding 
its  own  against  US  industry  but  losing  market  share  to 
Japanese  industry  in  certain sectors 
has  been  giving  cause  for  concern  with  its 
restructuring,  with  little  being  done  for  the  fastest-
growing  sectors  over  the  last  decade. 
b>  To  meet  the  challenge  of  the  fiercer  international 
competition  generated  by  industry's strategies  amongst  the 
Community's  main  rivals  <i.e.  the  USA's,  Japan's  and  the 
Pacific countries'>,  European  industry  and  governments 
2 have  embarked  on  a  major  recovery  campaign,  starting  in 
the  early  1980s  and  marked,  in  particular,  by  greater 
convergence  of  their  industrial  development  policies; 
however,  both  the  effort  and  the  returns  could  be 
greater  if  the  Community's  industrial,  technological, 
commercial  and  training structures could  be  adapted  more 
rapidly. 
c>  Based  on  these  findings,  the  areas  to  be  examined  with 
a  view  to  improving  the  Community's  industrial 
competitiveness  are 
- completing  the  internal  market  of  the  Community 
reaffirming  the  Community's  commitment  to  free 
international  trade,  which  is  embodied  in  the  GATT  system 
strengthening  the  industrial  base  of  the  Community 
promoting  the  adjustment  of  production structures 
encouraging  the  revitalization  of  European  industryam 
taking  advantage  of  the  major  contribution of  SMEs  to growth  am employment. 
making  a  firm  commitment ·to  achieving  the  objective  of 
economic  and  social  cohesion  in  the  Community 
making  it easier to  adapt  the  Community's  human  resources 
stimulating dialogue  and  concertation  on  economic  and 
social  matters  in  the  Community 
The  details  of  these  operational  aspects  will  be  described 
in  subsequent  presentations. 
2.  Summary  of  the  analysis 
The  Commission  analysis  is  subdivided  into  three  sections  : 
the  specific characteristics of  the  Community,  the  factors 
determining  industrial  competitiveness  in  the  Community  and 
the  opposing  strategies. 
a>  The  most  prominent  features  of  the  frame  of  reference 
against  which  the  Community's  industrial  competitiveness 
must  be  seen  are  : 
The  far-reaching  changes  in  industrial structures,  with 
the  services sector  growing  <to  account  for  almost  42~ of 
the  EEC's  GDP  50~ of  the  USA's  and  roughly  46~ of  Japan's>, 
the  expansion  of  the  black  economy  <sometimes  thought  to 
account  for  an  estimated  20~ of  the  GDP  of  many  Community 
countries  and  of  the  USA>,  the  expansion  of  in-house  trade 
by  very  large  multinationals  and  barter  trading. 
3 Europe's  capital  goods  and  services sectors  have  been 
particularly hard  hit  by  these  changes,  since their 
operating  environment  and  structures appear  to  be  more 
rigid  than  those  of  their rivals,  which  makes  it more 
difficult  to  assess  their real  position. 
The  specific characteristics of  industry  in  the 
Community,  and  in  particular its internal diversity  <which 
will  increase  further still with  enlargement>,  has  not  yet 
brought  all  the  benefits  which  it could  have  done  since  the 
markets  are  not  yet  sufficiently adequately  integrated  or 
cohesive  and  because  of  the  lack  of  a  rational  division  of 
industrial  labour  within  the  Community. 
The  Community  market  is exceptionally  open  to  outside 
competitors  which  means  that  European  industry  is  in 
constant  competition  with  its international rivals  :  the 
arithmetic  mean  of  the  customs  tariff for  industrial 
products  is around  6'- in  the  EEC,  the  USA  and  Japan  alike, 
but  the  Community  levies it on  only  a  very  small  proportion 
of  its imports  and  has  a  much  narrow  tariff spread  than  its 
rivals  <the  EEC  imposes  tariffs over  20'- on  only  five 
products,  against  ten  by  Japan  and  far  more  by  the  USA>. 
This  openness  is reflected  in  the  import  penetration 
rate  on  the  Community  market,  which  stood  at  13'- for 
industrial  products  in  1985  <compared  with  11'- in  the  USA 
and  5'- in  Japan>. 
b>  The  following  points  emerge  from  the  analysis  of  the 
factors  determining  industrial  competitiveness  in  the 
Community  : 
Generally,  after  a  period  of  structural  weakness 
between  1972  and  1982  brought  on  by  an  excessively  low 
investment  rate,  unfavourable  production  cost  trends,  heavy 
job  losses  and  loss  of  world  market  share,  European  industry 
has  started  to  recover,  with  its cost  competitiveness 
improving,  investment  picking  up  markedly  and  exchange  rate 
fluctuations  working  - up  until  1985  - in  its favour.  This 
improvement,  linked  to  favourable  circumstances,  should  not 
lead  to  an  under-estimation  of  the  structural  adjustments 
which  are still required.  But  Japanese  industry still 
enjoys  comparative  advantages  over  its European  rivals  in 
most  areas,  and  in  particular  on  productivity,  investment 
rate,  cost  of  capital  and  unit  labour  costs. 
Manufacturing  industry  in  the  Community  has  been  giving 
a  number  of  reasons  for  concern,  particularly because  of  its 
underinvolvement  in  the  fastest  growing  industries  <notably 
information  technology  and  electronics- and  markets 
<particularly  on  the  Pacific  market>.  European  industry  has 
failed  to  adapt  its output  to  the  changing  demand  in  these 
sectors,  resulting  in  market  penetration  by  third  countries 
increasing  far  faster  in  the  Community  than  in  the  USA  or 
Japan.  <Between  1973  and  1982  the  penetration rates  in 
4 these  sectors  rose  from  10~ to  17~ in  the  Community,  from 
·6.3~  to  10.2~ in  the  USA  and  from  4.2~ to  5.2~ in  Japan>. 
The  low  penetration rate  on  the  Japanese  market  indicate 
that  the  actual  level  of  protection  is higher  than  the 
nominal  rates of  custom  duty  suggest. 
Overall,  the  analysis  of  the  services sector  shows  that 
the  Community  is potentially well-placed,  though  the  lack  of 
uniform  statistics makes  analysis risky.  Integration  of  the 
Community's  internal  market  would  be  one  of  the  greatest 
boosts  to  competitiveness  in  this sector  in  future,  not  only 
in  services  themselves,  but  also  in  all  those  industries 
which  use  services. 
It must  also  be  added  that  the  traditional distinction 
between  manufacturing  industry  and  the  services sector  is 
becoming  less  and  less clear-cut,  however  much  it is needed 
for  statistical purposes.  Industrial  structures are 
changing  and  these  two  types  of  activity are  becoming 
inextricably  linked,  with  industrial  services  accounting  for 
a  large  proportion  of  the  growth  in  the  services sector. 
Lastly,  the  development  of  services  in  the  Community 
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has  an  important  role  to  play  for  employment,  particularly through 
the  contribution of  SMEs. 
There  seems  to  be  room  for  improving  the  Community's 
performance  on  technological  competitiveness.  Although 
Community  industry  has  the  advantage  of  the  top  know-how  and 
highest  production  levels  in  a  large  number  of  industries, 
it is still slower  to  incorporate  technological  progress 
into  its processes  and  products  and  less  adept  at  converting 
technological  potential  into  industrial  and  commercial 
success.  But  the  situation varies  so  widely  that  this 
general  verdict  must  not  be  allowed  to  block  out  the  revival 
now  under  way,  particularly  in  the  capital  goods  industries. 
Two  important  remarks  should  be  made  at  this point  : 
first,  the  Japanese  challenge  is not  so  much,  at  least 
at  present,  a  technological  one,  but  more  a  question  of 
industrial  logistics,  marketing  and  long-term  commercial 
strategy; 
secondly,  for  the  Community,  these  are  two  factors 
which  plays  as  important  a  role  as  technology  in 
determining  the  competitive  capacity  of  firms  :  the  firms' 
environment  which  is the  principal  public  policy  area  for 
industry  and  the  firms'  own  ability to  adapt  to  changing 
international  circumstances. 
The  major  curbs  on  the  competitiveness  of  European 
firms  are  that  their strategies  and  products  are  not  as  well 
tuned  to  the  market  <though  significant  lessons  can  be 
learnt  from  comparative  studies available  on  this subject>, 
that  they  are  less profitable  than  their rivals,  that  they 
have  little capacity  to  innovate,  with  the  result that  they 
are. falling  further  and  further  behind  Japanese  companies  in filing  patents  (Japanese  companies  filed  404  of  all patents 
worldwide  in  1980,  with  the  top  the  Japanese  companies 
accounting  for  one  third>,  the  lack  of  sufficiently forceful 
entrepreneurship,  as  reflected  in  the  far  lower  business 
start-up/failure rate  than  in  the  USA. 
c>  The  comparison  of  the  opposing  strategies  lead  to  the 
following  conclusions  : 
Japan's  rapid  progress  will  remain  the  greatest 
challenge  to  its rivals'  industrial  development.  Japan's 
success  is based  on  a  unified  economy  and  society,  with 
highly  concentrated  production  and  industrial  export 
structures,  and  an  efficient  industrial strategy,  whose 
weaknesses  should  nevertheless  be  mentioned  <shipbuilding 
and  aluminium  smelting  for  instance>.  The  most  striking 
eature  is that  Japan  has  been  giving  industrial  development 
priority  in  two  ways  :  first,  over  other  economic  and,  even 
more  so,  social  policy  objectives  and,  second,  by  putting 
the  future  before  the  present,  with  very  heavy  investment 
and  enormous  efforts  to  win  markets.  Consequently,  this 
strategy raises  the  problem  of  conditions  of  competition  on 
world  markets. 
America's  chief  aspiration  is to  meet  this challenge 
with  a  package  of  measures  to restore  its technological 
domination  and  revitalize its industry  :  impact  of  the 
Federal  budget  deficit,  tax  policy,  civil  and  military 
research,  industrial  cooperation,  trade  policy  and 
deregulation.  This  strategy  combines  the  benefits  of  general 
measures  to  revitalize  firms  with  the  industrial spin-offs 
of  preciser,  more  clearly  focused  management  of  research 
policy.  It could  have  a  major  impact  on  Community  industry. 
The  emergence  of  the  Pacific  countries  is the  third 
cause  for  concern  about  the  future  of  industry  in  the 
Community,  which  is  in  danger  of  being  left  out  on  a  limb  as 
these  countries  develop.  The  chief  problem  for  industry  in 
the  Community  is,  therefore,  to  avoid  succumbing  to  the 
fiercer  competition  aroused  by  the  growth  of  these  newly 
industrializing countries,  which  have  been  specializing  in 
branches  of  industry  similar  to  the  Community  far  more  so 
than  to  the  USA  or  to  Japan,  without  at  the  same  time  being 
able  to  exploit  the  advantages  of  their  newly-opened 
markets. 
The  Community  has,  beyond  question,  woken  up  to  this 
mounting  international  competition.  It has  made  significant 
progress  since  1982-83  in  the  form  of 
macro-economic  policies creating  a  more  favourable 
environment  for  the  development  of  producing  industries; 
the  convergence  of  national  attitudes  towards  industry, 
through  a  more  restrictive position  on  State  intervention 
and  making  policies  more  effective; 
6 making  sure  that  business  and  government  strategies 
take  greater  account  of  the  European  dimension,  notably  in 
the  form  of  joint  European  projects  <e.g.  ESPRIT,  BRITE, 
RACE,  EUREKA,  etc.>;  and 
strengthening  industrial  cooperation  between  firms 
inside  and  outside  Europe  <in  the  form  of  a  growing  number 
of  inter-firm  joint ventures>;  and 
adapting  human  resources  to  the  new  technologies  and  to 
the  European  dimension,  particularly  in  the  context  of 
Community  projects  <COMET!,  ERASMUS,  YES,  ... >. 
That  leaves  the  question  of  whether  the  movement  is  on  a 
large  enough  scale  and  intense  enough  to  restore  and  improve 
the  position  of  the  Community's  industries. 
7 IMPROVING  COMPETITIVENESS  AND  INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTURES 
IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
Introduction 
The  economic  crisis has  turned  industrial  competitiveness 
into  one  of  the  top  policy  objectives  for  industrial  and 
public  operators  <1>. 
In  1981,  the  Commission  services  produced  a  report  on  the 
competitiveness  of  industry  in  the  Community,  at  the  behest 
and  with  the  help  of  the  European  Parliament<2>  . 
The  Commission's  purpose  in this  communication  is to  provide 
all  the  parties concerned  with  a  basis  for  discussion  from 
which  operational  proposals  can  emerge.  The  ideas  set  out  in 
this document  must  not  therefore  be  construed  as  either 
recommendations  or  as  representing  the  definitive position 
of  the  Commission,  but  simply  as  arguments  designed  to 
provide  sustance  for  a  dialogue  which  are  open  to 
improvement  in  the  process. 
Consequently,  it makes  no  attempt  to  give  an  exhaustive 
description  of  the  state of  European  industry  <3>  nor  to 
update  the  1981  reports<4>  . 
<1>  cf.  for  example,  the  January  1985  report  from  the 
Commission  to  the  US  President  on  industrial  competitiveness 
<2>  The  competitiveness  of  industry  in  the  Community, 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  1981 
<3>  The  ideas set  out  below  apply  esclusively  to  "industry", 
by  which  the  Commission  means  all activities to  produce 
goods  or  provide  services for  the  market 
<4>  Commission  staff are  carrying  out  parallel  work  to 
update  these  reports. I.  FRAME  OF  REFERENCE  2 
On  the  whole,  over  the  last ten years  industry in the  Community  has 
been operating  in a  tight international context. 
Despite  this constraint and  the  pessimism pervading  so  many 
assessments  of  the  Community's  industrial performance,  European 
undertakings  have  not fallen behind  and  some  have  continued  to  register 
very respectable results on  world  markets. 
After all,  European  industry has  undeniable assets  to  help it 
to  stand  up  to  its international rivals,  even if it also  suffers  from 
weaknesses  stemming  from  certain  specifically Europ'ean  characteristics 
·  and  is  threatened by  the Community's  partners'  aspirations 
and  strategies. 
1.  Specific characteristics of  the European  socio-economic  environment 
This .  document  does  not  set out  to  examine  the particular 
situation ot  individual Member  States or different industrial sectors 
in the  Community,  but  to make  global  assessments  of  the  competitive 
situation of European  industry as  a  whole  compared  with external 
competition. 
Nevertheless,  internal diversity within the Community,  which 
remains marked  in certain areas,  determines,  in part,  its strengths 
and  handicaps  and  contributes  to  the definition of  the  context of  the 
competitiveness  of  its industry. 
a)  A mixed  economic  performance 
Since  the first oil shock,  for  the Community  : 
annual.  growth  has  been only  0.5%  lower  on  average  than  that  in  the 
us, 
employment  creation has  been extremely disappointing,  but 
productivity has  increased  rapidly  · 
the  share of world  trade  has  declined,  by  a  rate similar  to  that 
of  the  US  • 
.  . 
In a  context of  low  overall  economic  growth,  caused  among  other things  by 
insufficient redeployment  towards  expanding  sectors,  this effort 
undoubtedly occasioned great sacrifices. 
After  emerging  as  a  major competitor  to  the  US  in the period  up 
to  the first oil shock,  pressure from  Japan  and  the Pacific Basin 
confronted  the Community  at a  time  when  industrial  investments  had  not  yet 
been  ~epreciated and  before  a  very high degree  of  economic  integration 
could be achieved. 
b)  Internal diversity and  barriers 
Through differences  in historical background  and ·;i !1  Jhe. d.eve lopment 
paths  of Member  States has  come  a  much  less  homogenous  d~s~r~bution 
of  economic  activity and  degree  of  development  in the European 
Community  than in the  United States.  In addition,  the  second  round 
of  enlargement,  particularly,  will  lead  to  a  marked  weakening  in the 
degree  of  homogeneity  (see Table).  This  -is  a  structural 
characteristic,  and  over  time  differences  in economic  performance 
have  persisted,  notwithstanding recent  improvements  in certain.areas 
(notably  inflation and  the external deficit) 
and  this  is  a  factor  which  will  justify an  effort  by  the  Community 
to achieve  cohesion. 3 
From  the  point  of  view  of  demand,  the  profile  of  final 
demand  in  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  differs substantially 
from  the  rest  of  the  Community  with  a  much  higher  share 
going  to  food  and  clothing  and  a  much  lower  share  to 
investment  in  machinery  and  equipment  <see  graphs>.  In 
addition  the  industrial  sectors  of  new  members  are  even  more 
biased  towards  those  fow  which  demand  is growing  only 
moderately  or  slowly  than  that  for  the  Community  as  a  whole, 
with  the  result  that  they  are  likely to  add  to  the  already 
considerable  imbalace  in  fast-growing,  high  technology 
sectors. 
In  a  sense  this weakness  also  carries  a  strength  in  the 
form  of  a  great  diversity  of  the  production  base  and  its 
capacity  to  supply  markets  with  rare  combinations  of 
requirements.  Nevertheless  this rather specific type  of 
advantage  applies  mostly  to  certain  forms  of  non-
standardised  consumer  products  rather  than  mass  market 
consumer  goods  or  products  destined  for  the  industrial 
sector. 
The  industrial situation  of  less  favoured  regions  might  also 
be,  in  the  perspective  of  the  strengthening  of  the 
industrial  base  of  the  Community,  an  opportunity  to  develop 
new  productive  activities. 
Experience  since  the  first oil  shock  has  been  to  reinforce 
internal diversity.  Leaving  aside  the  on-going  process  of 
enlargement,  adaptation  to  the  more  competitive  atmosphere 
has  led  to  a  widening  of  the  difference  between  Member 
States'  individual  economic  performance.  Furthermore  in  the 
energy  sector,  in  which  substantial  investments  have  been 
made  and  Europe's  dependence  reduced  in  a  lasting  and 
significant  manner,  the  effect  has  been  to  introduce  a  much 
greater variability  in their response  to  changes  in  the 
price  of  energy,  than  before  the  first oil  shock.  These 
differences,  in  situation as  well  as  in  performance,  make  a 
common  European  response  even  more  difficult. 4 
c>  Human  resour~s 
Recent  experience suggests that economic  success no  longer rests 
essentially on  the  level of factor endowments  and  their rate of change, 
but that a  number  of  less material elements are playing an  increasing 
rOle.  This means  that Europe  must  concentrate on  working  out effective 
methods  of using its non-material resources and  enhancing their 
potential.  Since they are bound  up  with prevalent attitudes towards the 
firm  and  its rOle  in society,  with the educational system,  and  with the 
structure of relations within enterprises,  recipes can  not be  imported 
from  outside but must  be  developed  from  within. 
The  need  to balance risk with security,  the high  level of social 
endowments  and  the refusal to pass on  the negative  impacts of socio-
economic  developments  onto the individual are  common  features of Member 
States.  In a  number  of cases they have  given rise to rigidities,those 
on  the  labour market  and  on  the sectoral allocation of resources being 
the most  obvious.  However,  the need  for security is not necessarily 
incompatible with that of faster adaptation to the new  competitive 
conditions.  By  accepting the need  to provide for the social cost of 
such adaptation and  by  the use  of positive adjustment policies to assist 
the process,  adaptation can be  speeded  up  without compromising  security. 
At  the present time  increasing sectoral and  occupational mobility is a 
pre-requisite for the  improved  functioning of the economy. 
This question of mobility must  be  tackled  in a  concerted manner,  and  the 
preparation and  involvement  of the parties concerned  is essential if the 
changes  in view  are to succeed. 5 
2.  The  international context 
Over  the  last ten years  in general,  and  since  the  latest energy 
crisis in particular  (1),  the European  economy  has  been operating  in 
a  difficult international environment. 
This  state of affairs has  had  a  far-reaching  impact  on its 
competitiveness  and  on  the  scale of  changes  made.  It stems  partly 
from  basic  industrial  structures  in  the  Community  and  partly from 
the  importance  to  the  Community  of  maintaining free  trade  and  a 
competitive market. 
Some  of  the  chief constraints on  European  industry's  environment 
over  the  last  few  years  have  been  : 
a)  the  internal  Community  market  ~s exceptionally open  to  outside 
competitors 
This  is particularly evident  from  the  Community's  imports 
as  a  proportion of  GDP  and  from  industrial products'  share  of 
these  imports  : 
(1)  cf.  Statistical annex (2) 
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In  1985,  the  import penetration rate  (imports as  a  proportion of 
home  demand)  for manufactured  goods  stood at  13%  in the  Community, 
compared  with  11.2%  in the  USA  and  only  5%  in Japan.  It must  be 
stressed that  the  current  US  penetration rate very much  reflects  the 
strength of  the dollar over  the last three years.  In  1982  the  US 
rate was  only  9.5%. 
Within the  Community,  the  import penetration rate  grew fastest on 
the  high-demand markets,  where  it moved  up  seven points between  1972 
and  1982  to finish at  17%.compared  with  10.2%  in the  USA  and  5.2% 
in Japan  (1). 
There are  three reasons  why  the  Community  market  is  so  open 
its average  customs  tariffs are  low  with a  very narrow  spread. 
In  1984  the  average  level of  tariff protection on  the Community 
market  was  comparable  to  that on  the  Community's  two  leading 
partners'  markets  but  the  spread  was  much  narrower,  as  can be 
seen from  the  table  set out  below  : 
EEC  '.· 
USA 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
Source 
Average  level 
of  protection 
(industrial 
. products)· · 
6.4  % 
6.3  % 
6  % 
22.6  % 
openness  of  the markets 
Number  of products 
charged duties 
over  20% 
5 
large number 
10 
very large number 
GATT  and  Commission  departments 
Proportion of  industrial 
trade  covered  by  binding 
customs  duties  (2) 
100% 
100% 
83% 
14% 
(I)  cf.  European Economy  n°  25  and  Statistical annex  (also for  the 
definition of  high-demand  products) 
(2)  These  figures mean  that  the Community  and  the  USA  have notified  GATT 
of all customs  tariffs on  industrial products  and,  therefore,  may  not 
change  them  without first conducting negotiations  and  providing 
adequate  compensation under  the  GATT  arrangements.  This  obligation 
is  imposed  on only a  very small  fraction of  the developing  countries' 
customs  tariffs 7 
Only  a  limited proportion of  the Community's  imports  are 
actually charged  this tariff,  since  so many  of  the Community's 
trading partners are  granted  general  (EFTA  and  ACP)  or limited 
(GSP)  exemptions. 
As  the  Community  has  been integrating its market  (1),  it has  also 
been establishing greater freedom  of  external  trade.  In practice,  the 
Community  is far better placed  than its partners  to resist protectionist 
pressures,  because  the Member  States'  differeng  interests  leave no 
alternative but  to  reach a  more  liberal compromise  on  commercial 
policy decisions  and  also because its very open decision-making 
procedures  give  the  Community's  partners  every opportunity to voice 
their interests. 
It must also be  added  that current tariffs on  the  Community  market 
are;  of  course,  much  lower  than in the newly-industrializing countries, 
which,  moreover,  have  consolidated only a  very  small  proportion of 
their tariffs into binding  GATT  tariffs. 
Last  but  not least,  by  nature the very establishment and  repeated 
enlargement of  the  Community  has  always  been a  big boost  to  freer 
international  trade and  a  more  open market  because  : 
it has made  it possible  to  remove  customs  barriers  sooner; 
all the steps made  towards  completing  the  internal market  and, 
in particular the measures  on standardization and  on  the removal 
of  technical  barriers to.trade,  have  been non-discriminatory and, 
consequently,  of  equal  benefit  to  firms  from  the Community's  trading 
partners;  . " 
the  Community  has  continuously pursued  a  determined policy 
to  promote  competition and  free  trade. 
{I)  Cf.  in particular the rule prohibiting measures  having  an equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions on  imports  and  exports  and  the policy 
to  control state aid is  so  far as it affects trade between Member  States. 8 
b)  Overall  the  Community's  industry is more  exposed  to world  financ_ial 
and  monetary deregulation than its partners' 
Obviously,  deregulation of the world money  and  financial markets  has 
hit some  firms  harder  than others.  Exchange  rate fluctuations  have,  on 
occasion  worked  to  the benefit of European  firms.  In particular,  the 
long period of dollar strength up  to early  1985  gave  a  big boost  to  the 
competitiveness of  European goods  on  the  US  market.  However,  two  major 
factors  suggest  that on  the whole  this deregulation has hit European 
industry harder  than its US  or Japanese rivals  : 
despite  the  impact  of  the  European  monetary  system,  European 
firms  have  been  far  more  prone  to the general  climate of 
uncertainty. 
Against  this background,  European  firms  are clearly more 
vulnerable  to exchange  rate  risks  than their  rivals, especially 
since  foreign  trade  accounts  for  such  a  large proportion of 
their activity.  They  also  have  to  content  with  the  complexities 
born of  the  large  number  of  currencies  in the  Community. 
the Community's  pattern of  ~xports has  proved  more  vulnerable 
than its partners',  since  the  Community  is more  heavily 
committed  to  exporting  to  the  developing countries  in greatest 
difficulty.  Moreover,  the rapidly developing  economies  (and 
in particular  the Pacific region)  still take a  far  smaller 
share of  the  Community's  exports  than of  exports  from  the 
Community's  trading partners  (1) •. 
(I)  Cf.  CEPII  (Centre  d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Information Internationale) 
report entitled  :  "Economie  Mondiale  1980-1990,  la fracture",  1984  and  the 
Statistical annex. 
The  Community's  telecommunications  hardware  exports are one  striking 
example.  Between  1978  and  1983  the EEC's  share of  OECD  exports 
of  telecommunications  hardware  (telephone  exchanges,  switchboards,  etc.) 
slumped  from  46%  to  less  than  30%,  while Japan's rose  from  14.5%  to 
23%  and  the USA's  from  15.7%  to  19.3%.  One  of  the chief reasons  for  this 
poor performance  lay in the weak  geographical distribution of  the EEC's 
exports,  and  in particular the very  small  share  going  to  the Asian 
countries  (cf.  Trade  in IT  and  communications  services:  the  impact  on 
trade in hardware of  the restructuring of  the  telecommunicat~ons 
services market,  OECD,  ICCP  (85)14). 9 
c)  Fiercer international competition 
Community  industry has  been,  and  still is,  up  against  increasingly 
fierce foreign  competition 
large sections of  the  European  economy  have  been under  pressure 
from  their rivals'  export strategies; 
Technology has  heightened  competition and  necessitated faster,  more 
painful restructuring  He.re  toQ  E~ronean industry has  been handicapped 
by  a  s Lowe~ rate of  adjustment.  .  . . .  '  '  It must 
also be  stressed that countries,  such as  Japan,  which are still catching 
up  and,  consequently,  growing  faster have  been forcing  the pace with 
their technological development policies,  thus  inevitably shortening 
plant and  product life. 
d)  Rapidly changing  industrial structures 
A fourth point must  be  added  :  the  far-reaching restructuring of 
production which  sometimes  makes  it difficult to discern the real 
industrial  trends.  Three :broad  developments  must  be  stressed  : 
the emergence  of  the  services sector  :  henceforth seryices will 
account  for a  major  share of  the value  added  and,  even/more  so,  of  the 
jobs  created in the  leading industrialized countries.  This  can be 
attributed partly to  the expansion of conventional  services  (e.g. 
banking,  insurance,  etc.)  and  partly to  the  increasing encroachment 
of  servi·ce-type activities into manufacturing  as  new  technologies 
spread.  As  yet little is known  about the  impact of  the changes,  since 
the available statistics do  not give .the full·picture.  The  Commission 
has  decided  to  embark  on  a  study on"this  subject in response  to 
Parliament's call to  follow up  the  1981  report on  competitiveness. 
This  communication  takes  account  of  the preliminary results of  the 
work  on it. 
Expansion of  th~·black economy  :many studies have  suggested  that 
the  black  economy  sometimes  accounts  for  over  20%  of  the  GDP  of  certain 
Community  countries and  of  the  USA.  They  view this expansion as  one 
of  the chief explanations  for  the marked  decline  in productivity growth 
in industry and  as  a  further  complication for macro-economic  trend 
analyses  (I) 
(1)  cf.  in particular "Consommation"  the social  and  economic  review 
published by  CREDOC  (Centre  de  recherche,  d'etudes et de  documentation 
sur la consommation),  Vol.  4,  October-November  1982) 10 
Increasingly complex  trading relations  :  just as  the black economy 
blurs  the picture of  the  home  economy  and  makes  up  for  some  of its 
shortcomings  or faults,  a  series of  shifts in international  trade 
have  been making it increasingly difficult to assess  and  interpret 
patterns of  trade  : 
First,  the  share of  international trade  absorbed  by  in-house 
trade  by very large multinationals  and  the  links  between  such 
t·rade  and  the undertakings'  strategies on  industrial  cooperation 
and  establishing branches  in other countries are growing  closer 
(one  US  Senate report found  that  the  top  300  US  undertakings 
accounted  for  two  thirds of  the  USA's  exports  and  one  third of 
its imports); 
Barter  trading is expanding  rapidly,  taking  increasingly 
complex  forms  and  spreading  to new  geographical areas; 
There  ahs  been growing  trade  in services,  which  are far 
harder  than goods  to  analyse with  today's methods  of  gathering 
data  and  statistics  (I). 
(I)  cf.  Statistical annex 11 
II.  FACTORS  DETERMINING  INDUSTRIAL  COMPETITIVENESS  IN 
THE  COMMUNITY 
Amongst  the numerous  factors affecting competitiveness,  this chapter 
will concentrate on  those areas for which  reasonable  information exists 
and  in which  significant developments have  occurred since the 
publication of the first report  in 1981.  It will attempt to isolate the 
factors which  appear to have  had  an  over-riding  importance rather than a 
complete presentation of all of the areas which  may  affect 
competitiveness  in one  way  or another.1 > 
The  determining role played by  the general business climate and 
environment  <macro-economic  context,  social climate,  etc.>  must  be 
stressed,  because it is in this field that policy makers  hold special 
responsibilities. 
1.  Industrial competitiveness 
<a>  General  factors 
Within the area of quantifiable factors affecting competitiveness,  the 
level and  development  of costs,  both for  labour and  for capital,  are 
amongst  the most  important determinants: 
-Developments  in  labour costs arise from  a  number  of factors,  of which 
wages  are only one.  Non  wage  costs,  productivity and  exchange  rates 
have  all exercised strong influences on  international developments  in 
the real cost of  labour.  These  developments  have  shown  rather different 
patterns in recent years than over the  longer term,  which,  if sustained, 
would  imply  a  much  more  favourable  competitive position for the 
Community  with regard to  labour costs.  Between  1973  and  1982  real wage 
costs in the Community,  expressed  in national currencies,  rose at a  rate 
half way  between  those of the  USA  and  Japan.  However,  differentials in 
productivity growth meant  that  labour costs per unit of output  in the 
u.s.  and  the Community  developed  in a  comparable  fashion,  whilst those 
of  Japan  declined substantially. 
Since  1982,  the  increase  in real wages  in the Community  has slowed 
considerably  <1.2%  per annum  between  1982  and  1985  against  2.9%  over the 
period  (1982/73>,  whereas  the tendency of the previous period was 
maintained  in the USA  and  Japan.  Taken  with recent progress in  labour 
productivity,  the moderate  growth  in real wages  has  led to a  drop  in 
unit  labour costs for the Community  as a  whole.  Nevertheless, 
spectacular differences remain  between  Member  States.  Certain countries 
<Netherlands,  Denmark,  Germany>  have  seen their unit costs fall by  over 
3 % per annum,  whilst others  <UK>  have  seen their performance 
deteriorate. 
Domestic  developments  have  been reflected  in international 
competitiveness to only a  small extent because  exchange  rates have 
become  sharply out of  line from  purchasing power  parities.  These 
developments  have  recently enabled the Community  not only to make  up 
lost ground,  but  even  to achieve a  new  level of competitiveness when 
unit costs are expressed  in a  common  currency.  Using  1972  as a  base 
1 > cf.  Economie  Europ~enne No.  25,  September  1985 12 
equal to 100,  unit  labour costs in a  common  currency  in 1985  for the 
Community  had  reached 87.7 compared  with 102.5 for Japan  and  110.5 for· 
the u.s.  With  the current volatility of the exchange  markets,  these 
positions can  be  quickly reversed,  and  it remains,  therefore, 
appropriate to use real unit  labour costs in national currency as an 
indicator of cost developments over the  longer term,  confirming the 
advantage  of  Japan  over both the Community  and  the U.S. 
- Measuring developments  in the cost of capital is less straightforward 
than that of  labour.  Real  long term  interest rates affect firms 
differently,  in part because of very favourable  legislative conditions 
for depreciation,  in part because  interest payments  reduce tax 
liabilities,  and  because  of the very different ratios of debt to equity 
which  are to be  found  across countries and  between firms.  Real  interest 
rates have  risen sharply across the world  and  it does not appear that 
Community  rates are substantially higher than those of its main 
competitors.  In the case of the U.S.,  however,  the very high interest 
rates now  prevailing have  been borne  almost  entirely by  consumers,  since 
the real burden  to industry has been  cut  through the  implementation of 
new  rules governing depreciation  <Accelerated  Cost  Recovery  System>  and 
investment  tax credits,  notably those  laid down  in the Economic  Recovery 
Act  of  1981  and  the Tax  Equity and  Fiscal Responsibility Act  of 1982.  In 
addition it is clear that the fragmentation of financial  markets  in the 
Community  is a  factor  increasing costs for European  firms. 
Although  the development  of costs are important factors determining 
competitiveness,  the capacity to develop new  products and  reply to the 
demand  are of even  greater significance.  In turn,  the level of 
investment represents a  very  important  indicator of the state of the 
productive apparatus and  therefore the capacity to reply to this 
challenge of fast changing markets. 
Since  1973,  the rate of  investment  <share  of gross fixed capital 
formation  in value added>  for European  industry has been declining 
regularly with that of American  industry  increasing.  After 1982,  the 
investment rate of American  industry has  exceeded  that for the Community 
<see  Graph>,  with Japanese  industry regaining a  very high rate,  after a 
sharp drop  in the mid-seventies.  Between  1972  and  1980  industrial 
investment  increased five times as fast  in Japan as in the Community  and 
in the United  States by  ten times.  Since then,  industrial  investment 
stagnated  in Europe,  only reaching its level of 1980  again in 1985, 
whilst both Japan  and  the United States showea comparable  growth  <184>. 
This slow  down  in industrial  investment  is such that the upswing  under 
way  in the Community  in no  way  compensates  for the accumulated  handicap. 
Of  particular importance  for competitiveness is the structure of 
investment.  Thus  it is in the high growth sectors  <computers  and  office 
machines,  electrical and  electronic goods,  chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals>  that the slow-down  has been  most  marked  for the 
Community  and  the acceleration most  significant in the United States and 
Japan.  As  an  explanation for this surprising development  it should be 
noted that the rate of return on  invested capital at replacement  cost 
fell faster than in the United States and  Japan.  Moreover,  this fall  in 
the rate of return in the Community  is generally faster than that for 
industry as a  whole,  so that the actual rate of return in high growth 
sectors is now  below  that for other sectors,  contrary to the Japanese 
and  U.S.  experience. 13 
Lastly,  conditions of supply for raw  materials  <cost,  conditions for 
access,  etc.>  also constitute an  important factor  in the competitiveness 
of several  industrial sectors. 
<b>  Manufacturing  industry 
In spite of the recent  improvement  in the Community's  external balance, 
and  the strongly positive balance of trade  in manufactured  goods,  for 
which  exports should  exceed  imports by  ~o % in 1985,  a  number  of 
structural weaknesses  have  developed  over the years.  Of  particular 
importance  in this respect are the capacity to reply to growing  demand 
and  to supply the most  developed  markets.  Sectors in areas of fastest 
growing  demand  <double  the average rate>  are to be  found  in electrical 
and  electronic machinery,  data processing,  office machinery  and 
precision instruments,  chemicals and  pharmaceuticals  <see  table>. 
Sectors of weak  demand  Cbelow  average>  cover textiles and  clothing,  iron 
and  steel,  metal products,  non-metallic minerals and  other manufacturing 
products. 
If the ranking of  industries according to growth  of demand  remains very 
stable across countries,  differences in growth rates make  for an  unequal 
distribution of the total market.  Thus  taking the Community,  U.S.  and 
Japan  together,  the Community  represents  ~~% of the combined  population, 
but only 37  % of the market  for industrial products and  33  % of the 
market  for high technology products.  The  U.S.  with 37  % of the combined 
population represents  ~2 % of the market  for high technology products, 
and  Japan with only  19  % of the population 25  % of that for high 
technology.  Taking  into account  remaining  imperfections of the European 
market,  the U.S.  and  Japan therefore possess a  sizeable advantage  in 
terms of both the size and  rate of growth  of their markets. 
Geographical  coverage  of markets  is important,  because developed 
countries not  only represent the  largest and  most  stable areas for 
industrial products,  but they are also  leaders in innovation.  Being 
competitive on  these markets,  therefore,  is necessary to maintain the 
overall dynamism  of  industry.  In terms of the geographical coverage of 
trade,  the Community  imports primarily amongst  the  industrialized 
countries from  the u.s.,  Japan and  S.E.  Asia  but  exports to the  less 
competitive areas of other members  of O.E.C.D.  developing countries and 
state trading countries.  In terms of market  share,  the Community  has 
been  losing heavily  in the fast  expanding sectors,  notably electrical 
equipment  and  office machinery,  but gaining market  share for those 
sectors for which  demand  is growing  only slowly.  The  U.S.  and  Japan, 
however,  have both been gaining market  share heavily  in the fast 
expanding sectors at between  2 % and  5  % per annum.  In addition 
industrialized countries account  for only  3~ % of EEC  exports for high 
and  medium  technology goods,  against  ~5 % for Japan  and  51  % for the 
u.s. 
Europe's disappointing export  performance  is mirrored by  r1s1ng  import 
penetration for electrical goods  and  office machinery,  whilst that for 
intermediate and  lower  technology goods  has been held to levels 
comparable  to that of the U.S.  Poor  export  performance  and  rising 
import  penetration point to a  slow  adaptation of European  industry to 
the changing structure or demand  and  slow  take up  of technical 
innovation.  At  a  time of slow  overall growth,  certain sectors with a 
high technological content have  benefitted from  a  sustained  increase in 14 
demand  of between  5%  and  13%  per annum.  These  sectors are 
substantially the same  throughout  the developed countries.  Sectors of  . 
average demand  are also those of medium  technological content  <increases 
of demand  between  2 % and  5 % per annum>  whilst sectors of slow 
increases  in demand  correspond to products with  low  technological 
content  <growth  of demand  of 0  to 3% per annum>. 
The  lack  of success of Community  industry in replying to the demand  for 
high technology products and  in maintaining market  share has  led to a 
deterioration of its relative specialisation 1 > towards slower growing, 
lower  technology  items.  This  in turn increases its vulnerability to 
competition from  the Newly  Industrialized Countries and  to difficulties 
facing developing countries in financing  imports because of the fall  in 
the price of oil and  the  international debt crisis. 
<c>  Services 
Competitiveness in services has become  an  increasingly important  issue 
because  the service sector has displayed much  more  dynamic  growth  than 
manufacturing,  because  a  combination of technical  innovations affecting 
the office environment,  deregulation and  the  increasing recourse of 
industrial firms to specialised suppliers makes  the service sector both 
much  more  diverse and  much  more  important  as a  determinant  for the 
performance  of the business sector.  In this context,  competitiveness in 
the services sector can be  appreciated  in two  ways,  as a  contribution to 
the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and  in terms of the 
competitiveness of  internationally traded services.  Since many  producer 
services,  notably marketing,  finance  and  Consultancy,  are of  increasing 
importance to the goods  producer sector,  the quality of such services is 
important as a  determinant of overall industrial performance.  In 
addition,  certain types of services,  including project consultancy, 
congenerate direct exports through the specification of goods  produced 
in the country of origin of the provider of the service.  A report of 
the U.S.  International Trade  Commission  cites many  examples  of such 
1  inkages.  1 > 
With  regard to international competitiveness in services,  the 
restrictions placed on  the free  flow  of services mean  that balance of 
payments statistics do  not necessarily reveal  comparative advantage. 
Such  restrictions are of particular significance for producer services. 
A recent  GATT  inventory of restrictions to trade  in services runs to 
twelve pages  . 
Where  limitations are placed on  trade  in services,  many  firms  in 
internationally competitive sectors choose  to open  subsidiaries abroad. 
In this way,  they can  build up  a  sizeable position on  foreign markets, 
export the practices of the country of origin,  thereby  indirectly 
favouring  other firms  from  the same  source,  and  come  to control 
significant parts of certain services which  are of great  importance  to 
industrial competitiveness.  The  establishment of management  counselling 
1 >  Share  of  these  products  in  industrial  exports  and 
production 
1 >  The  relationship  of  exports  in  selected  U.S.  service 
industries to u.s.  merchandise  exports. 15 
services by  U.S.  specialists represents an  obvious example.  In the 
field of accountancy,  seven of the top revenue  earning firms  in the USA 
in 1983  were  also amongst  the top ten auditors in the  UK  in terms of the 
numbers  of companies  audited by  each  firm.  Ultimately,  such 
developments  could  lead to a  concentration of "know  how"  in the hands of 
controlling firms. 
Proportionately,  international trade  in services is much  less important 
than trade  in goods,  because  many  services are,  by  definition, 
untradeable.  Nor  is it true that trade in services has been  growing 
particularly fast.  If investment  income  is excluded,  growth  rates for 
services have  been below  those for goods  throughout  the  1970s.  A 
similar geographical distribution of trade in services to that for goods 
can  be  observed,  with the developed  countries taking a  dominant, 
although declining share  (82% of  imports and  73% of exports in 1981>. 
Of  trade in services  <excluding  investment  income>  freight has been 
taking a  declining share  in the total and  other private services an 
increasing share,  with the categories other transport,  travel and 
government  transactions more  or less stable.  The  category "other 
services"  is very heterogeneous,  and  indeed different reporting 
practices mean  that coverage varies from  country to country.  Within 
this category are usually to be  found  property  income,  banking,  non-
merchandise  insurance,  construction and  engineering,  films and 
broadcasting and  a  residual "other services-other" which  makes  up  the 
greatest part of  the group  in value. 
Trade  in services is much  more  important for the Community  than for the 
US  and  Japan.  In 1983,  the share of private services in total exports 
for  the  US  and  Japan  lay at  11%  against  20%  for the Community. 
Looking  at the balances for  individual  items for services,  the Community 
maintained  a  positive balance for transport until 1983  when  it became 
negative.  The  actual amount  of the balance fluctuated rather widely 
over the period  197~-83 with a  maximum  of  2~10 million ECU  in 1980  to a 
minimum  of  -257  million  in 1983.  This compares  very favourably with 
Japan  and  the u.s.  which  ran deficits of 3  1/2 billion and  2  1/~ billion 
ECU  respectively in 1983.  On  travel,  the Community's  consistent deficit 
mirrors that of  Japan,  with the U.S.  also running a  deficit around  half 
of that of  Japan  in most  years. 
·Other services,  covering the crucial areas of many  producer services, 
remain one  of the great strengths of the Community.  Not  only is the 
current surplus nearly double  that of the U.S.,  but it increased at a 
faster rate than that of the U.S.  over the period 1974/83.  At  the same 
time  the  Japanese deficit widened  sharply to reach 8 billion ECU  against 
an  American  surplus of 9  1/2 billion ECU  and  a  European  one  of 16 
billion. 
Overall,  the analysis of the service sector trade shows  that the 
Community  has strong points.  The  main  advantages of the Community 
appear to lie in advisory and  construction services  <ranee>  in banking 
and  insurance  < United-Kingdom>,  in transport  <Netherlands,Greece  and 
Denmark>,  and  tourism  <Mediterranean regions>. 
But  these strong points are not fully exploited because  of the 
fragmentation of the market  for services in the Community.  Work  at the 16 
Community  level to do  away  with obstacles to the free movement  of 
services must  be  strengthened.  This is essential,  not  only for the 
future  of services themsleves,  but also for the competitiveness of 
manuacturing  industry which  is more  and  more  dependent  on  them. 
Manufacturing  industry can  not  hope  to be  competitive nor make  most  use 
of its resources without adequate  access to the Community's  whole 
potential in the fields of consultancy,  banking,  insurance,  data 
processing and  software,  engineering and  many  other services 17 
2.  Technological  competitiveness 
Technology  is considered  to  be  one  of  the  most  decisive 
factors  for  industrial  competitiveness  in  the  90's.  This  is 
as  true  for  industrial  sectors  with  a  high  rate  of  tech-
nological  development  <e.g.  informatics,  telecommunications, 
bio-technology)  as  it is for  the  more  mature  sectors  such  as 
shipbuilding,  textiles,  clothing,  foodstuffs  and  construc-
tion. 
It  is  through  its wide-ranging  contribution  to  increased 
productivity  potential  of  all  factors  of  production,  from 
labour,  capital,  materials  and  energy  to  inventory  stock 
control,  organisation  and  management,  quality  control  and 
marketing,  that  new  technologies  assumes  its central  role  as 
determining  industrial  competitiveness.  This  fact  also 
explains  why  all  sectors,  regardless  of  product  or  service 
produced,  are  faced  with  the  task  of  mastering  the  state-of-
the-art  technology. 
Automation  in  the  manufacturing  industries  is  now  a  major 
objective  of  European  industrial  policies  and  the  strengthe-
ning  of  technological  innovation  policies  has  become  an 
industrial  necessity. 
From  the first  stage  of  automating  continuous  production 
processes  <1960-1970>,  development  perspectives  have  become 
much  further  reaching  and  today  encompass  automating 
machining,  assembly,  handling  and  inspection,  in  practice 
regardless  of  length  of  series or  economies  of  scale.  A 
growing  proportion  of  manufacturing  industries  can  now  be 
automated.  The  economic  impact  of  such  modernization  is 
important  for  the  Community:  the  gross  value  added  by 
industry  represents  almost  40%  of  total  value  added  in  the 
Community. 
Although  attention  today  is clearly  focussed  on  the  high 
technology  sectors  and  new  technologies,  technological  ad-
vance  and  the  mastering  of  state-of-the-art technology  play 
a  decisive  role  for  the  competitiveness  of  all  individual 
enterprises  and  of  industry  as  a  whole: 
Whereas  production  of  the  technologically  advanced 
equipment  and  products  is  in  itself a  major  economic 
issue  for  the  Community,  the  strategic  importance  of 
advanced  technology  is far  larger,  as  its use  in  both 
production  equipment  and  new  products  is  a  potential 
source  of  spectacular  improvements  in  industrial  pro-
ductivity.  It permits  increases  in  the  period  of  use  of 
production  equipment  <moving  towards  24  hours-a-day>, 
it  introduces  flexibility  in  the  production  process 
improving  market  adaptability,  it makes  possible  auto-
mation  of  small  production series  and  reduces 
production  time  in  general. 18 
In  the  course  of  this development  the  present  day  dis-
tinction  between  leading-edge  and  mature  industries  or 
sectors will  gradually  disappear.  Since  the  potential 
for  increasing productivity  and  flexibility  is greater 
in  mature  industries  <and  probably  most  so  in traditio-
nally  labour-intensive  industries>,  so  is the  incentive 
to  employ  the  new  technology.  Already  there  are  signs, 
in  the  automobile  industry  for  example,  of  a  proces  of 
"dematurity"  leading,  through  use  of  advanced  produc-
tion  techniques,  to  changes  in  competition  parameters 
of  enterprises  in  the  industry  including  product  spe-
cifications  <design,  durability,  performance>  and 
capability of  <large>  firms  to  respond  to  changing 
markets. 
Increasingly,  the  dividing  line will  be  between  those  enter-
prises  who  make  full  use  of  the  new  technology  and  those  who 
do  not  within  the  same  industrial  sector.  It  is  less  impor-
tant  whether  a  particular  industrial  sector  is successful  in 
making  this transition  than  whether  a  sufficient  number  of 
firms  across  industry  manage  to  adopt  to  and  develop  new 
technology  in  their field.  Hence,  the  challenges  of  new 
technology  go  far  beyond  any  narrow  sectoral definitions; 
they  concern  the  competitiveness  of  Community  industry  as  a 
whole,  indeed  its ability  to  exploit  new  opportunities. 
To  assess  the  state  of  Community  industry  in  this respect 
and  the  means  for  improving  the  Community's  technological 
competitiveness,  the  following  distinction  can  be  useful: 
a.  The  "product ion'-'  o.L_pew  techno logy,  norma 11 y  ref  erred 
to  as  research  and  development,  which  takes  place  in 
public  and  private sectors alike, 
b.  The  use  of  new  techniques  in  the  production  process, 
normally  leading  to  increased  productivity  and  flexi-
bility,  reduced  waste,  improved  product  and  quality 
control,  economies  in  management,  servicing  etc, 
c.  The  implementation  of  new  techniques  into  the  products, 
leading  to  improved  product  performance,  versatility  in 
use,  product  quality  and  new  products. 
A strategy  for  improving,  since  maintaining  and  further  de-
veloping  the  technological  competitiveness  of  the  Community 
industries  must  have  the  aim  of  reducing  <possibly  removing> 
constraints  and  limitations at  each  of  the  three  levels  abo-
ve  while  taking  account  of  the  interactions  between  them. 
a.  Production  of  new  technology  - R&D 
According  to  estimates  for  1985,  total  R&D  expenditure  in 
the  USA  and  Japan  is roughly  equivalent  to  2.9  and  2.5  per 
cent  of  GNP,  respectively.  This  compares  to  an  average  for 19 
the  Community  of  about  2  per  cent·  In  absolute  terms  Japan's 
R&D  spending  is roughly  half  that  of  the  Community  whereas 
the  USA  is using  50  per  cent  more  than  the  Community,. 
Although  these  overall  figures  would  indicate  an  R&D  effort 
for  the  Community  as  a  whole  which  is  comparable  to  what  is 
done  by  the  main  competitors,  some  qualifying  remarks  are 
necessary  with  regard  to  the  impact  of  R&D  on  technological 
competitiveness: 
The  Community  has  been  and  still is spending  a  larger 
fraction  than  both  the  USA  and  Japan  on  basic  research, 
primarily  carried  out  by  universities  and  related  ins-
titutions.  Conversely,  notably  the  USA  is spending  much 
more  on  applied  research  and  development,  related  to 
military  and  space  programs  and  industrial  spinoffs.  It 
could  be  said  that  whereas  both  the  USA  and  Japan  are 
to  a  large  extent  carrying  out  R&D  with  a  view  to  later 
practical  industrial  use,  the  Community  is trying  -
within  the  same  general  magnitude  of  amount  spent  - to 
cover  the  entire  range  of  R&D  activities,  from  basic 
scientific research  to  industrial  prototypes. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  industrial  competitiveness 
this difference  in strategies has  meant  that  the  Commu-
nity  industry  in  crucial  R&D  areas  is  lagging  behind 
its main  competitors.  This  is  of  particular signifi-
cance  in fields  where  R&D  today  is providing  the  key 
production  technology  and  products  of  tomorrow,  notably 
semiconductors  <the  raw  material  of  Information  Tech-
nology,  automation  and  computer  integrated  manufac-
turing>,  new  materials  <including  composites,  ceramics, 
joining  techniques  and  surface  treatments>  and  chemis-
try  and  biochemistry2 • 
It is  a  generally  accepted  fact  that  Europe's  future  in 
chemistry  and  chemical  engineering  lies  in  specializing 
into  fine  chemicals  and  specialities with  high  value 
added.  Bulk  commodities  such  as  standard  fertilizers 
are  facing  still harder  competition  from  oil-countries. 
However  the  finer  end  of  the  market  is  equally  competi-
tive  with  a  strong  presence  of  American  and  Japanese 
firms  supported  by  major  R&D  efforts.  These  efforts 
lead  unavoidably  to  higher  productivity  in  the  chemical 
industry  and  it is thus  indispensable  to  increase 
Europe's  R&D  activity.  Areas  to  be  covered  are 
catalysis,  particle  technology,  separation techniques, 
1.  See  also  table  YY  of  the  appendix  for  details for 
1981 ,the  last  year  for  which  comparable  international 
statistics are  available. 
During  the  70ies  Japan  has  increased  R&D  expenditure 
from  1.5  to  2  per  cent  of  GNP  and  is  expected  to 
further  increase  to  3  per  cent  in  1990.  The  USA  is 
forecast  to  increase  R&D  expenditure  from  94  Billion 
dollars  in  1984  to  116  Billion  in  1987. 
2.  Specific  R&D  areas  have  been  defined  in  the  framework 
of  Community  programmmes  ESPRIT,  BRITE  and  RACE. 20 
membrane  science  and  technology,  computer  modelling  of 
molecules,  genetic  engineering  and  use  of  computers  to 
control  processes,  the  latter permitting  economies  in 
small-scale  batch  productions. 
A continued  Community  deficiency  in  the  areas  mentioned 
would  lead  Community  industry  into  obsolete  and  non-
developing  niches  of  production  and  force  even  the  most 
advanced  firms  to  source  technology  from  the  USA  and  Japan, 
a  situation to  some  extent  already  present  in  semiconductor 
technology.  Should  this  become  a  general  phenomenon,  a 
European  presence  in  the  most  competitive  markets  would  be 
next  to  impossible  to  maintain. 
The  efforts sustained  in  Japan  by  MIT!  and  in  the  USA  by  the 
Department  of  Defense,  NASA  and  the  National  Science 
Foundation  are  ample  proof  of  the  strategic  importance 
attached  to  mastering  these  technologies  __  .  As  a  result, 
Europe  capacity  in  engineering  and  soft-ware  should  be 
strengthened  through  appropriate  measures  to  exploit  the 
potential  of  the  industries  concerned  <large  engineering 
firms,  technical  consultants,  high  technology  SMEs>.  The 
direction  of  European  R  and  D  programmes  towards  applied 
research  and  demonstration  projects  is  a  means  to realize 
this objective. 
b.  Production  technology 
Whereas  the  level  of  European  R&D  efforts  would  seem  at  par 
with  those  of  our  main  competitors,  the  situation  is 
different  in  the  field  of  production  technology.  Community 
standards  require  substantial  improvements  in  a  number  of 
industrial  sectors  - notably  those  which  supply  inputs  for 
other  industries  - and  a  wide  range  of  areas,  of  which  some 
are  identified  below: 
Improvements  leading  to  higher  productivity  include  the 
use  of  advanced  techniques  and  equipment  such  as 
CAD/CAM,  industrial  robots,  lasers,  fully  automated 
paint  spraying  systems  and  robotized  arc  welding,.  The 
Community  is gaining  ground  in  these  areas  as  illustra-
ted  by  the  following  figures:  in  1983  Japanese  industry 
employed  16,500  robots,  USA  8,000  against  some  10,400 
in  Europe.  Estimates  for  late  1984  give  the  figures 
44,000  for  Japan,  13,000  for  the  USA  and  20,500  for 
Europe.  The  Community  has,  after  a  relatively  slow  be-
ginning,  been  able  to  catch  up  with  and  even  overtake 
the  USA  and  close  part  of  the  gap  to  Japan  in  the  use 
of  industrial  robots. 
Although  many  of  the  basic  technologies  needed  to  main-
tain  and  further  develop  this position  are  being  tack-
led  at  Community  level  already,  this area  involves  very 
1.  c.f.  Advanced  Manufacturing  Equipment  in  the  Community, 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council, 
COM<85)112,  final,  for  further  reference 21 
substantial  investments  for  individual  enterprises. 
These  investments  can  be  recuperated  within  the  short 
write-off  period  only  if certain production  levels, 
necessitating  a  Community-wide  market,  can  be  attained. 
Improvements  are  needed  concerning  the  reliability of 
machinery  and  the  ability to  predict  its residual  life. 
Both  become  important,  the  more  expensive  the  machinery 
and  the  more  costly  for  the  enterprise  if  a  piece  of 
equipment  fails. 
The  investments  necessary  for  the  individual  enterprise 
before  it can  employ  the  most  advanced  production  tech-
nology  available  poses  a  particular problem.  It is  a 
characteristic of  Community  industry,  that  it consists 
of  a  few  large  and  many  medium-sized  and  small 
enterprises.  They  need,  as  do  other  enterprises,  to 
improve  productivity,  product  ranges  and  product 
quality  through  new  technology.  An  effort  to  simplify 
new  production  systems,  to  reduce  their complexity  and 
bring their costs within  the  reach  of  SMEs  is  of 
particular  importance  to  Community  industry. 
Introducing  flexibility  in  manufacturing  poses  yet  an-
other  challenge.  Increasingly,  survival  in  competitive 
situations  demands  flexiblilty.  In  everything  - from 
clothes  to  motor  cars  - a  single  factory  must  be  able 
to  produce  a  number  of  different  models  simultaneously 
and  to  change  proportions  of  the  various  models  and 
their characteristics to  meet  demands  of  a  rapidly 
changing  market. 
This  can  be  obtained  by  integrating,  notably,  new 
information  technology  into  the  production  process, 
today  in  the  form  of  CAD/CAM,  but  ultimately  in  the 
form  of  computer-integrated  manufacturing  covering  not 
only  decisions related directly  to  production  but  also 
the  overall  business  strategy  of  the  firms.  Europe's 
position  is  one  of  weakness  in this field,  notably  due 
to  the  dominance  of  large  American  firms.  However, 
proposals  already  on  file  with  the  Commission  show  that 
there  in  the  Community  industry  is both  the  will,  the 
capacity  and  the  ability,  all  backed  by  substantial 
expert  knowledge  in  universities  and  research  institu-
tes,  to  meet  this challenge. 
The  development  towards  what  has  been  termed  "the 
factory  of  the  future",  i.e.  a  factory  integrating the 
components  NC  machine  tools,  robots,  flexible  cells, 
flexible  production  systems,  local  communication 
networks,  computer  aided-management,  engineering  and 
design  has  already  brought  forward  large  enterprises  in 
the  engineering,  electrical,  electronics  and  computer 
sectors.  It is clear that  large  companies  play  a  cen-
tral role  in  the  development  process.  However  it is 
equally  clear that  small  businesses  are  also  caught  up 22 
in,  must  adapt  to  and  play  a  significant  role  in  this 
industrial  transformation. 
The  fact  that  all  European  enterprises,  regardless  of  size, 
product  or  nationality,  need  to  apply  the  most  up-to-date 
technology  in  production  makes  the  areas  mentioned  above 
particularly  important  for  Community  industry.  It is equally 
important  to  assure  that  the  Community-wide  demand  can  be 
met  by  production  techniques  that  do  not  have  to  be  tailored 
according  to  10  or  12  different  national  standards. 
c.  Product  technology. 
Whereas  access  to  technological  know-how  and  up-to-date 
production  technology  are  necessary  elements  for  industrial 
competitiveness,  they  are  not  sufficient  to  secure  it.  The 
product  itself,  implementing  new  technology  directly  <e.g. 
chips  in  wrist-watches,  new  materials>  or  indirectly  <e.g. 
improved  design  and  reliability,  improved  servicing  and 
marketing>  is essential. 
In  this field  Japanese  industry  has  proved  second  to  none 
especially  in  consumer  goods  such  as  cameras,  TV-sets,  video 
recorders,  HI-FI  equipment,  cars  etc.  As  explained  elsewhere 
industrial  policy  measures  coupled  with  original  home  market 
protection  has  led  Japanese  information  technology  industry, 
notably  computers  and  certainly  telecommunications,  to  rapid 
development. 
Community  industry has  been  far  less  sucessful  in  implemen-
ting  new  technology  into  products  over  a  wide  range  of  mar-
kets.  Likewise  it has  been  often  too  late  to  introduce  new 
products  or  product  specifications- product  innovation  has 
been  too  slow 1  •  For  several  reasons  this is the  key  problem 
in  European  technological  competitiveness: 
In  Information  Technology  the  Community  suffers  from 
lags  in  the  introduction  or  the  availability of  new 
products  and  technologies,  notably  in  the  semiconductor 
industry.  In  this  industry,  first  entry  implies  that 
the  company  is  in  a  position  to  offer  lower  prices  than 
all competitors  due  to  the  combination  of  high  produc-
tion  volume,  rising quality  and  falling  costs.  Late 
entrants are  trapped  at  positions higher  up  the  lear-
ning  curve  than  the  first-comers.  Furthermore,  because 
of  the  strategic position  of  the  semiconduct9r  industry 
as  supplier  for  a  range  of  other  industries,  forces 
these  industries  to  seek  supply  from  the  first-comer, 
more  often  than  not  of  Japanese  or  us  origin.  But  since 
domestic  users  tend  to  have  easier  and  earlier access 
to  both  new  products  and  lower  prices,  European  semi-
conductor  users  are  at  a  competitive  disadvantage. 
If  in  the  semiconductor  area  Europe  is able  to  supply 
only  a  diminishing  proportion  of  the  needed  components, 
1.  See  also  section  on  innovation  below. 23 
the  telecommunications  industry  is doing  somewhat  bet-
ter due  however  to  well  established  producer-user rela-
tionships,  promotion  of  national  champions  and  public 
dominance  of  the  PTTs. 
These  positions  can  only  be  maintained  and  developed  if 
a  truly  European  telecommunication  industry  can  be 
created  over  the  forthcoming  years.  1 
In  other  fast-moving  advanced  technology  markets,  ~ 
sumer  electronics  for  example,  Community  industry  has 
retreated  into  well  established productions  of  engine-
ered  commodities  such  as  colour  TVs  without  an 
equivalent  activity  in  R&D.  The  result  has  been  a  sub-
stantial  loss  in  industrial  employment. 
In  office  automation  the  main  development  ahead  is to 
link  presently unrelated  office  machines  and  functions 
<typewriters,  storage  media,  word  processors,  photoco-
piers,  private  branch  telephone  exchanges  <PBXs>  and 
computers>.  Although  Europe  has  a  presence  in  this 
market,  it does  not  cover  the  entire  range  of  products 
and  maintains  a  position  only  in  typewriters.  Word 
processors  and  computers  are  heavily  dominated  by  US 
producers,  and  Japanese  and  US  photocopiers split that 
market.  Hence  the  Community,  although  strong  in  PBXs, 
lacks  the  product  ranges  needed  to  introduce  a  complete 
automated  office system. 
One  of  the  key  technologies  of  importance  to  future 
industrial  competitiveness  is that  of  new  materials. 
The  Community  is  a  long  way  behind  the  us  and  Japan, 
notably  because  of  the  central  support  given  to  this 
research  area  in  the  two  countries.  The  USA  situation 
is  formidably  difficult  to  challenge,  since  so  much  R&D 
in  new  materials  and  their applications  has  been  funded 
100  per  cent  over  many  years  from  the  defence  and  space 
budgets. 
The  Community  problem  is dominated  by  the  engineering 
aspects  of  new  materials,  their performance,  the  meth-
ods  of  manufacturing  components  from  them,  the  problems 
of  mixed  use  of  metals  with  composites,  ceramics  and 
plastics,  and  hence  the  problems  of  joining  them. 
Failure  to  master  these  techniques  would  bar  Community 
industry  from  competing  in  a  number  of  rapidly  expan-
ding  markets  as  well  as  traditional markets,  where  the 
use  of  new  materials  improve  product  performance, 
durability  and  reliability. 
Product  innovation  in all fields  has  thus  become  a  critical 
factor  in  competition,  and  the  speed  of  change  itself adds 
to  the  European  problem  of  catching  up  in  a  number  of  areas. 
1.  See  COM<85>276  :  Commission  communication  to  the  Council 
"State  of  Community  policy  in  telecommunications". 24 
3.  COMPETITIVENESS  OF  ENTERPRISES 
The  evidence discussed  in a  preceding section on  manufacturing  industry 
showed  that  in the EC  development  of growth  sectors was  limited,  and  as 
a  result,  supply has not  followed  demand,  import  penetration  increased 
more  than  in the  US  and  Japan.  This  lack of competitiveness can be 
explained notably by  the insufficient integration of the European  market 
which  prevents European  firms  from  taking advantage of a  domestic market 
comparable  to that of their American  and  Japanese competitors and  by 
insufficient profitability of  industry  in the Community. 
Recent  work  1 > concluded that: 
<i>  the rate of return on  invested capital,  which  is the most 
significant  indicator of profitability,  declined  in the sixties and 
seventies in the Community; 
<ii>  in the period  1981  to 1984  the rate of return in the Community  as a 
whole  appears to have  remained  more  or less constant;  its present  level 
is probably  lower  than adequate  from  the standpoint of fostering 
sufficiently strong  investment,  employment  and  economic  growth; 
<iii>  profitability has recovered more  strongly in the US,  which  helps 
to explain  in part why  investment  there has grown  even  more  strongly 
despite the high rate of  interest. 
In the free market  economy  of the Community,  enterprises obviously bear 
and  must  keep the first responsibility in the fight  for  industrial 
competitiveness.  In this context the following factors play a  major 
role: 
a>  strategies of  enterprises 
b>  finance 
c>  motivation,  management  and  education 
d>  entrepreneurship 
e>  capacity for  innovation 
f>  specific characteristics of SMEs 
3  a>  Strategies of enterprises 
The  notion of strategies for enterprises is wide-ranging and  three focal 
points will be  discussed below: 
i>  market  features and  investment 
ii>  the establishment of global operations 
iii>  quality and  market  orientation. 
1 >European  Communities  Economics  Policy  Committee,  May  1985 
<II/02/85-EN>,  Profitability and  rates  of  return  in  the 
Community.  See  also  Tables  xx  and  yy  in  annex. 25 
i>  Market  features and  investment 
The  most  important characteristic is that the market  in which 
enterprises perform is global.1>  The  major areas,  the US,  Japan  and  the 
EC,  which  form  the bulk of this global market,  have  several problems  in 
common:  developed  economies,  technologies,  rising social costs,  aging 
populations,  jobs  <especially skilled ones>  are becoming  scarce and  R&D 
costs are escalating.  Their markets also have similarities with 
converging products and  converging consumer  needs and  preferences,  2> 
the Community  market  being characterised by  barriers and  internal 
disparities which render it much  less homogenous  than the American  and 
Japanese markets. 
The  pace  of technological  innovation and  of its commercialisation, 
especially in the high technology  industries has become  so rapid that 
product  life cycles are shorter than before and  a  technological 
advantage  can be  eroded  very quickly. 
Lead-times for competitors to acquire comparable  technology become 
shorter.  Thus,  prompt  setting-up of the production process  <through 
flexible  equipment>  and  of the commercialisation of advances  in 
technologies through a  superior distribution capability become  the key 
to success. 
As  the cost of developing and  placing new  products in the market  kept 
rising,  the  importance of penetrating several markets simultaneously and 
quickly  increased.  These  "global" products  <with  minor  modifications to 
cater for local tastes>  have  to rely on  investment  in capital-intensive 
flexible production with automation and  robotisation,  which  in turn need 
the  larger market  even  more.  1>  2> 
On  this issue,  many  EC  firms  have  lagged behind  Japanese and  the US 
companies,  as seen not only from  the  lower  levels of  investment  <Table 
xx>  but also from  the comparison of consumption of advanced  electronics 
and  of installed automation and  robotisation  <Tables xx,  xx  and  xx>. 
1 >  Customers  in  US,  Japan,  Europe  buy  about  85X  of  all 
computers  and  consumer  electronics products.  US,  Japan  and 
Germany  buy  70X  of  world  numerically-controlled  machine 
tools. 
2>  It  is not  only  demand  patterns  and  product  life cycles 
that  have  similarities,  but  also  the  "consumer  education" 
and  infrastructure resulting  from  comparable  levels  of 
economic  and  technological  development. 
1 >  Even  markets  the  size  of  the  US  or  Japan  may  still be 
relatively  small  in  supporting  fully  automated  plants  for 
world  markets  <eg.  semiconductors,  machine  tools>. 
2>  Typical  examples  of  repercussions  of  this capital 
intensive  production  are  the  productivity  increases  in  the 
automobile  and  consumer  electronics  industry  but  also  in 
processes  in  the  chemical,  textile  and  steel  industry. 26 
ii>  The  establishment of global operations 
Establishing global operations is necessary  in order to penetrate world 
markets rapidly simultaneously  w~Lh domestic markets and  therefore 
amortise the high costs of developing and  of placing new  products. 
The  Japanese  firms  have  been successful  in this sphere mainly  through a 
cost  leadership strategy,  pursued  throughout  the cost-chain:  design  1>  , 
lower-cost production  <sophisticated planning,  automation,  minimal 
stocks and  work-in-progress,  "just-on-time system"  etc.>  and  efficient 
distribution networks  through  the Trading Houses.  2) 
In order to open  up  and  maintain global scale operations they have 
resorted to getting established  in other markets  through 
- the usual development  of distribution channels 
- partnerships,  joint-ventures,  subsidiaries. 
They  resorted to the latter for the following three reasons: 
- very high cost of breaking-in 
- existence of  important regional differences in business 
practices 
- existence of risk  ~f protectionist measures. 
Japanese corporations did not stay domestic  in "peaceful" niches without 
competition,  trying only to reduce production and  overhead costs,  but 
developed  somewhat  "fighting" attitudes towards competitors'  markets. 
The  evidence is that they have  developed  a  high commitment  to global 
operations and  devoted the appropriate funds  and  human  <managerial> 
resources.  One  cannot  say the same  for the efforts of  EC  companies  to 
establish themselves  in a  defacto  insider position in Japanese  markets, 
in order to bypass overt or covert  import difficulties.  In 1980,  a 
staff of 852  was  employed  by  European  firms established in Japan,  and 
some  13000  by  European  offices of  Japanese  companies.1>  Despite the 
existing differences in the size of markets and  the disparities in 
European  economies,  this is evidence of an  enormous  gap. 
1 >  Japanese  companies  like  Seiko,  Sony,  Cannon,  Matsushita, 
Casio  and  Honda  have  been  making  special  efforts to  develop 
products  for  all  markets,  having  their designers  spend  a  lot 
of  time  in  contact  with  foreign  customers  and  dealers. 
Trading  houses,  through  their  established  networks  have  also 
been  contributing  to  design  for  global  products. 
2>  The  cost  contribution  of  the  Trading  Houses  on  final 
product  cost  is fairly  low  due  to  their efficiency  and 
persistantly minimal  profit  margin  of  about  2%.  <Source: 
OECD,  Japan's  general  trading  companies,  198~> 
1 > Source:  JETRO 27 
Recent  surveys also indicate that Japanese  and  US  firms are fairly 
readily entering into cross-border relationships.1>2>  There  are of 
course partnerships undertaken by  European  firms as well  <eg.  British 
Leyland-Handa,  Nissan-Volkswagen>.  But  the  emerging pattern from  the 
list of several recent  and  planned  joint ventures between  US-Japanese 
companies,  given  in Table x  in the annex  shows  the  increasing importance 
of the trans-Pacific production system. 
Of  course there is a  critical size for companies  wishing to go  for 
global operations,  depending  on  product,  below  which  such a  strategy is 
not sustainable.  There  are however  enough  EC  firms  of sufficient size 
3>  that could go  for global operations on  top of those that already 
have,  with more  aggressive strategies for third country markets and  more 
comprehensive  ones within the EC.  In the perspective of world-wide 
activities for firms,  the development  of cooperation between  industria-
lised regions of the Community  and  less favoured  areas should be 
supported. 
iii>  Quality and  market  orientation 
An  important  ingredient of business strategies beyond  price/cost 
leadership,  is the competitive position in quality and  other non-price 
characteristics.  Non-price  factors are not  easily defined or 
quantifiable and  no  satisfactory statistical indicators are available. 
Nevertheless,  product quality,  including reliability,  design,  styling, 
after sales service,  on  time delivery and  safety do  play an  important 
role  in competitiveness. 
Recent  extensive surveys  1>  have  shown  that the samples  surveyed  thought 
Japanese  companies  to pay  particular attention to quality with very good 
after sales service and  on  time delivery,  which  in combination with 
aggressive marketing strategies has  led to high penetration of other 
markets. 
1 > Survey  on  International  Cooperation,  by  the  EMF 
Foundation  1985 
2>  An  increasingly  important  share  of  imports  to  the  USA 
come  from  foreign  subsidiaries  of  American  companies,  as  US 
firms  take  their manufacturing  off-shore.  Taiwan  for 
example  had  a  trade  surplus of$  11  billion with  US  in  1984. 
Four  of  its  10  largest  exporters  were  RCA,  Texas 
Instruments,  General  Instruments  and  Atari,  all  four  being 
US  firms. 
3>  TABLE:  the  100  largest  world  companies  <ranked  by  sales> 
1966  1976  1 982  1984 
USA  69  47  43  46 
JAPAN  3  1 1  1 1  1 2 
EC  21  35  34  26 
Europe  non  EC  7  1  3  3 
Rest  of  world  0  6  9  1 3 
<Source:  Fortune> 
See  also  Table  x  with  world  200  largest  by  industy  branch, 
in  annex. 
1 )  EMF 28 
The  importance  of "quality"  in competitiveness has been  recognised by 
industry  in several Member  States,  which  have  embarked  upon  "quality" 
campaigns.  And  the recent development  of EC  policies in standardisabon 
and  certification are certainly a  step in the same  direction.2> 
Companies'  attitudes towards quality go  hand  in hand  with marketing 
strategy.3> 
The  above  surveys found  that Japanese  companies  adopt  a  strong 
orientation towards sales,  market  intelligence and  marketing emphasis  in 
a  more  aggressive approach. 
2>  The  existence  of  standards  which  reflect  the  requirements 
of  world  markets  can  help  enterprises design,  make  and  sell 
products  with  the  quality features  that  customers  want. 
3>  An  interesting  indicator  of  their marketing  orientation 
is advertising  expenditure,  given  in  the  table  below. 
Advertising  expenditure,  per  capita  in  US  $,  1982 
USA  285 
JAPAN  90 
EC-average  83 
(Belgium  115,  Denmark  115,  France  76,  Germany  87,  Greece  19, 
Ireland  37,  Italy  55,  Netherlands  130,  UK  115> 29 
3  b>  Finance and  profitability 
The  relative position of a  company  within an  industry  depends  on  cost 
advantage  and/or differentiation,  the two  elements on  which  firms are 
based  to obtain  sustainable competitive advantages. 
As  discussed above,  Japanese  companies  have  been  successful mainly 
through  a  cost  leadership strategy,  supported by  substantial  investment 
in technology,  equipment,  and  commercialisation.  The  rapid development 
of this technological,  production and  distribution capacity was  based  on 
the availability and  cost of borrowed  capital  in Japan at a  time  when 
similar developments  in EC  and  us  were  not possible due  to  lower  savings 
rates and  higher money  cost.1 >  The  Japanese rates of return on 
invested capital were  sufficiently high compared  with the cost of 
borrowed  money  and  firms grew  on  debts  (positive financial  leverage>. 
This was  encouraged  by  the  lending policies of  industry-oriented banks 
and  finance houses  having equity links with major  industries.  This 
allowed  further rationalisation of  Japanese production,  which  in turn 
reduced  further costs and  increased value added. 
The  relatively  low  cost of capital,  and  the particular business and 
banking  culture on  borrowing is reflected  in the proportion of companies 
total assets financed  by  borrowing.2> 
Despite the measurement  problems,  the relative  importance  of this 
information is not  diminished.  It shows  that among  the countries 
examined  Japanese  firms had  the highest gearing ratios  <proportion of 
borrowing>,  US  companies rely most  on  own  resources with the  EC  being an 
intermediary case with variations amongst  the Member  States.  This is an 
indication that  Japanese  firms  have  been  able to raise funds  through 
borrowing  without  losing control by  issuing shares to outsiders.3) 
Thus,  their real return on  own  <share>  capital has been relatively 
higher than it would  have  been  with other forms  of financing. 
European  firms did not  have  either sufficiently wide  access to the stock 
market,  a  major  source of corporate financing  in other advanced 
industrialized countries.  In the  EC  the  UK  stock market  is the  largest 
1)  The  superior  Japanese  performance  in  investment  is 
certainly related  to  the  higher  availability  of  low-cost 
unds,  which  in  turn  is  based  on  the  record  national  savings 
rate  which  in  1982  was  30%  of  GDP,  almost  twice  that  of  US 
at  16%.  In  Europe,  gross  domestic  savings  as  a  percentage 
of  GDP  were:  Germany  21%,  France  18%,  UK  17%,  Italy  19%,  EEC 
average  17.6%  <see  Tables  xx,  yy,  zz  on  savings,  GFCF  in 
Annex>. 
2>  See  Table  xx  in  Annex,  comparing  total  borrowing  as 
percentage  of  total  assets  of  companies  in  France,  Germany, 
UK,  us  and  Japan. 
3)  The  potential  advantage  of  positive  leverage  in 
maintaining  ownership  and  control  is probably  weaker  in 
countries  like  the  US  where  stock  markets  are  making  equity 
a  more  common  form  of  company  funding  and  where  ownership  is 
already  fairly  widely  dispersed. 30 
one,  and  ranks fourth world-wide  2>  with 2400  firms quoted.  In 
contrast German  companies  are less involved  in these activities:  only 
450  companies  were  listed on  the German  exchange  in 1983  with a  combined 
stock value of  OM  225  billions,  about  1/3 of that  in London.  In 
comparison,  the  US  stock market  is not only  large but also broad based: 
the top-ten American  companies  account  for  16%  of the total  <including 
giants like IBM>.  The  Netherlands have  the most  narrowly based  stock 
market  with 3  companies  accounting for 62% total capitalisation.  3> 
For these reasons,  the Commission  has for some  time  been  engaged  in 
efforts to harmonize  the conditions for stock exchange  flotation and  to 
reinforce the cohesion of stock markets  in the Community  <IDIS  project>. 
2>  After  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  NASDAQ,  the  American 
over-the-counter  system  and  the  Tokyo  Exchange. 
3>  Share  ownership  in  US  is  also  the  widest,  about  one  in 
five  Americans  own  shares,  against  a  minimal  4%  in  UK  and  an 
increasing  proportion  in  Belgium  <12%  in  1984>. 31 
3  b>  Finance and  profitability 
The  relative position of a  company  within an  industry  depends  on  cost 
advantage  and/or differentiation,  the two  elements on  which  firms are 
based to obtain  sustainable competitive advantages. 
As  discussed above,  Japanese  companies  have  been  successful mainly 
through a  cost  leadership strategy,  supported by  substantial  investment 
in technology,  equipment,  and  commercialisation.  The  rapid development 
of this technological,  production and  distribution capacity was  based on 
the availability and  cost of borrowed  capital  in Japan at a  time  when 
similar developments  in EC  and  US  were  not possible due  to  lower  savings 
rates and  higher money  cost.1 >  The  Japanese rates of return on 
invested capital were  sufficiently high compared  with the cost of 
borrowed  money  and  firms grew  on  debts  <positive financial  leverage>. 
This was  encouraged  by  the  lending policies of  industry-oriented banks 
and  finance  houses having equity  links with major  industries.  This 
allowed  further rationalisation of  Japanese production,  which  in turn 
reduced  further costs and  increased value added. 
The  relatively low  cost of capital,  and  the particular business and 
banking culture on  borrowing  is reflected  in the proportion of companies 
total assets financed  by  borrowing.2) 
Despite the measurement  problems,  the relative importance of this 
information is not diminished.  It shows  that among  the countries 
examined  Japanese  firms  had  the highest gearing ratios  <proportion of 
borrowing>,  US  companies rely most  on  own  resources with the  EC  being an 
intermediary case with variations amongst  the Member  States.  This is an 
indication that Japanese  firms have  been  able to raise funds  through 
borrowing without  losing control by  issuing shares to outsiders.3> 
Thus,  their real return on  own  <share>  capital has been relatively 
higher than it would  have  been  with other forms  of financing. 
European  firms did not  have  either sufficiently wide  access to the stock 
market,  a  major  source of corporate financing  in other advanced 
industrialized countries.  In the  EC  the  UK  stock market  is the  largest 
1 >  The  superior  Japanese  performance  in  investment  is 
certainly related  to  the  higher  availability  of  low-cost 
unds,  which  in  turn  is based  on  the  record  national  savings 
rate  which  in  1982  was  30%  of  GDP,  almost  twice  that  of  US 
at  16%.  In  Europe,  gross  domestic  savings  as  a  percentage 
of  GDP  were:  Germany  21%,  France  18%,  UK  17%,  Italy  19%,  EEC 
average  17.6%  <see  Tables  xx,  yy,  zz  on  savings,  GFCF  in 
Annex>. 
2>  See  Table  xx  in  Annex,  comparing  total  borrowing  as 
percentage  of  total  assets  of  companies  in  France,  Germany, 
UK,  US  and  Japan. 
3>  The  potential  advantage  of  positive  leverage  in 
maintaining  ownership  and  control  is probably  weaker  in 
countries  like  the  US  where  stock  markets  are  making  equity 
a  more  common  form  of  company  funding  and  where  ownership  is 
already  fairly  widely  dispersed. 32 
one,  and  ranks fourth world-wide  2>  with 2400  firms quoted.  In 
contrast German  companies  are less involved  in these activities:  only 
450  companies  were  listed on  the German  exchange  in 1983  with a  combined 
stock value of  DM  225  billions,  about  1/3 of that in London.  In 
comparison,  the US  stock market  is not only  large but also broad  based: 
the top-ten American  companies  account  for  16%  of the total  <including 
giants like  IBM>.  The  Netherlands have  the most  narrowly  based stock 
market  with 3  companies  accounting for 62% total capitalisation.  3> 
For these reasons,  the Commission  has for some  times been  engaged  in 
efforts to harmonize  the conditions for stock  exchange  flotation and  to 
reinforce the cohesion of stock markets  in the Community  <IDIS  project>. 
2>  After  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange,  NASDAQ,  the  American 
over-the-counter  system  and  the  Tokyo  Exchange. 
3)  Share  ownership  in  US  is also  the  widest,  about  one  in 
five  Americans  own  shares,  against  a  minimal  4%  in  UK  and  an 
increasing  proportion  in  Belgium  <12%  in  1984>. 33 
3  c>  Motivation,  management  and  education 
i>  Motivation 
Industrial efficiency depends  on  many  factors ranging from  the obvious 
ones,  like wage  levels and  output per capita,  to more  qualitative 
factors related to employee  performance.  And  performance at work  is not 
only a  result of education  <discussed  further below>  but also of 
flexibility and  motivation. 
The  Japanese workforce demonstrates  low  absenteeism,  low  turnover, 
readiness to accept  new  tasks and  willingness to contribute to corporate 
goals.  According  to a  Japanese  survey by  the Office of the Prime 
Minister,  nearly half of Japanese  companies  employees  viewed  their work 
as their principal "raison d'~tre" and  one  third declared themselves 
willing to sacrifice their private lifes for their companies.  This 
consideration has to be  related to the social commitment  of large 
Japanese  companies which  leads them  to assume  a  greater role in the 
fields of education and  social protection than their European 
counterparts  <this partly balancing the relatively weak  public 
involvement  in these matters as compared  to European  standards>. 
The  results of  an  international survey 1 > comparing  attitudes to work 
in several  industrial countries showed  that in Japan,  the traditional 
readiness to devote one's life to "the company"  was  diminishing.  While 
this represents a  relative decline  in the work  ethic in .Japan, 
performance  is still superior to that of its main  competitors. 
In the traditional Japanese  <life-time>  employment  system,  the high 
morale  of the work  force  in the big companies  is accompanied  not only by 
limited strikes,  low  turn-over and  low  absenteeism,  but also by 
increased willingness to propose  and  accept  introduction of new 
technology and  processes  <2>. 
Statistics on  strikes given  in the Table  below  confirm such attitudes in 
the Japanese workforce,  as well as more  positive attitudes and  working 
concensus  in U.S. 
The  Japanese system of decision making  through extensive consultations 
and  consensus-building through participation procedures apparently 
ensures better implementation of sophisticated plans,  quality in 
production etc.1 >  There are recently developments also in EC  firms on 
participative procedures,  including quality circles,  where  teams  of 
workers are given the opportunity to  improve  products and  processes.  The 
fact remains  though  that the social consensus  in Europe  in regard to 
industry is less favourable  than the one  prevailing in the US  and 
certainly in Japan.  The  need  for reinforcing active intra-company 
participation and  dialogue between  economic  partners is thus obvious,  in 
strengthening the dynamism  of the entreprise economy. 
1 >  US  Aspen  Institute for  Humanistic  Studies,  1983, 
"Japanese  in  the  '80s" 
<2>  Statistics on  the  number  of  working  days  lost  per  year 
in  the  various  countries  are  attached  in  annex  38 
1>  This  system  of  course  slows  down  the  speed  of  taking 
decisions,  which  under  certain circumstances  eg.  of  very 
fast  moving  products,  may  be  counterproductive. 34 
ii>  Management 
Managerial  motivation and  the quality of business executives are 
obviously also very  important  for competitive performance. 
This is because managers  are responsible for analyzing  their firms' 
activity,  identifying competitive advantages,  devising strategies and 
implementing  them  consistently,  and  putting innovations into practice. 
Recent  surveys suggest that 
- Education and  training of managers  in Europe  are  inadequate.  The 
business institutions do  not prepare them  with the same  thoroughness as 
in the us  and  the companies  do  not  find  enough  incentives to invest  in 
training. 
- Executive earnings in the EC,  according to 1985  surveys,  are on 
average significantly lower  than  in the US  and  Japan,  especially for top 
management.  Besides,  managers  in US  get equity stock as strong 
additional  incentives.2> 
- The  EC  business environment  does not apparently offer the same  social 
rewards  for success.  Moreover,  failures are generally considered as a 
handicap  in Europe  when  they often appear as a  positive experience for 
managers  in the US,  with the consequences such  an  appreciation implies 
for entrepreneurial dynamism. 
Professional management  and  scientific concepts related to it 
historically developed  in Europe  later than in the US,  for two  main 
reasons: 
- Greater direct  involvement  of family-type  owners  of European  companies 
in business administration.  This has created some  uncertainties and 
confusion between  operational responsibilities of managers  and 
proprietal prerogatives,  contributing to creation of conflicts.  It is 
also seen as being unconducive  to the international mobility of 
management. 
- The  fragmentation of the European  market.  Professional 
management  first developed  and  performed  well  in mass 
production and  distribution in large and  homogeneous 
markets.  The  EC  market,  which  has not  the degree of 
integration and  homogeneity  of the US  and  of the 
Japanese market,  did not provide a  sufficiently strong 
incentive for adapting mass  production  and  process 
methods.  Neither did it provide an  incentive for 
developing  large integrated systems of production/ 
procurement/marketing. 
These  historical developments  are reflected even  today  in the 
organization and  corporate structure of large firms  and  in managerial 
attitudes and  performance:  European  managers  are seen to have  a 
disadvantage for designing global strategies and  products,  to be  less 
attracted by  overseas posts and  by  cross-border industrial cooperation. 
<new  positive developments  however  are taking place as discussed  in 
section IV> 
2>  "Stock  option  plans  as  incentives",  Report  EUR  9596,  1985 35 
~ii> Education and  training 
The  educational system seems  to have  been  less suitable for producing 
the high proportion of engineers,  researchers and  businessmen required 
in the  EC  for the new  type of  international business.  1> 
Existing and  anticipated human  resource requirements for new 
technologies at advanced  level  <engineers,  scientists,  high  level 
technicians>  clearly exceed  current higher education outputs,  both 
quantitatively and  qualitatively.  This is true not  only  in absolute 
terms  -within the Community  - but also  in comparison with the 
Community's  most  serious competitors,  the United States and  Japan. 
Firms,  in particular,  SMEs  consider that the  lack of qualified people 
represents a  major  obstacle to full exploitation of new  technologies, 
and  justifies particular attention to training. 
Results from  a  recent trilateral survey  2)  show  for  example  that in 
Germany  no  fewer  than  55%  of the user factories regard the shortage of 
people with suitable micro-electronics expertise as a  very  important 
problem.  In Britain the proportion is 45  % and  in France  51%.  This 
deficiency is considered  even  more  serious than,  say,  the  lack  of 
finance  for development  or production costs. 
On  the quantitative side,  the problem  can be  briefly illustrated by 
reference to the situation in the  US  and  Japan.  It is important 
nevertheless to point out the problems  of comparability of statistics 
which  create uncertainty.  The  number  of engineering graduates per year 
per million inhabitants is 260  in the European  Community.  In the United 
States it is 350,  in  Japan it reaches 630.3.  The  graduate  input of 
Japan  and  the United  States is impressive by  any  standards.  In terms of 
sheer numbers,  the United States was  producing almost  1.3 million 
graduates and  post-graduates per year at the turn of the decade.  The 
figure for  Japan  was  over 400,000.  The  rate of graduation from 
universities is of course directly related to the proportion of young 
people  entering higher education,  which  in turn is related to the 
numbers  of school  leavers obtaining the necessary qualifications for 
entry.  Here  again the comparisons  with the United States and  Japan,  and 
also with sweden,  are particularly striking. 
If one  takes further education as a  whole  <i.e.  including university> 
entrants as a  percentage of  a  generation amount  to  61%  in the  US  and  37% 
in Japan against respectively 20%  in Germany,  32%  in France,  28%  in 
Italy and  29%  in the  UK  <but  33%  in Denmark>  <Source  - OECD  1985> 
The  proportion of an  age  group acquiring diplomas giving access to 
higher education amounted  to  87%  in Japan  <1981),  72%  in the  US  <1980>, 
82%  in Sweden  <1982)  - but  only  26%  in Germany  <1982),  25%  in Denmark 
(1980),  28%  in France  <1983),  39%  in Italy  (1981>,  26%  in the  UK  (1981) 
and  44%  in the Netherlands  (1981>  <Source- OECD  1985). 
1)  COM(85)  431  Final  - COMETT 
2>  Source:  PSI,  YDI  and  BIPE  report  on  Microelectronics  in 
Industry  - an  international  comparison  (1985> 
3)  Source:  NEDO  Report  on  Competence  and  Competition,  1984 36 
On  the qualitative side,  education  in Japan  seems  to be  more  operational 
than  in Europe,  although with some  rigidities.  Mathematics  and  science 
form  an  integrated and  heavily emphasized  part of  the Japanese school 
curriculum.  Standards are assessed by  experts to be  very high owing  to 
better trained and  motivated teachers and  to very tough competition and 
examinations.  The  level  expected  from  students entering University is 
almost  equivalent to that attained  in the  end  of the second  year in the 
best  US  universities. 37 
3  d>  Entrepreneurship 
The  relative  importance of creation of new  enterprises,  in comparison to 
business failures 1 >,  on  the basis of the data available,  is generally 
seen to be  less favourable  in Europe  than  in US. 
According to a  recent study  2>  there are three apparent  factors that 
seem  to inhibit entrepreneurship in Europe  and  in Japan  more  than in 
USA: 
- the  level and  structure of taxation,  certain regulations and 
governement  intervention 
- cultural barriers,  such as the attitude to venture capital,  banruptcy 
and  geographical  and  proessional mobility,  and  the shortage of 
entrepreneurs prepared to start up  businesses 
- financial  infrastructures and  the scarcity of venture capital. 
Concerning  finance,  the  main  problems  which  should  be 
underlined  is the  insufficient  integration  of  financial 
markets  in  the  Community,  which  are  too  narrow  to  reply  to 
the  financing  needs  of  European  firms,  in particular  from 
the  point  of  view  of  venture  capital.  However,  progress  has 
ensued  from  the  development  of  secondary  stock  exchange  in 
France,  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  US  venture capital market  on  the other hand  apparently works  much 
better.  The  US  has a  significant expertise in this sphere,  which,  it 
has been  suggested,  coud  be  exported  <like management  consulting in the 
60's>.  Estimates vary as to the actual size of US  risk-capital market, 
but it is likely to be  a  multiple of the estimated ECU  5.5 bn  European 
market  <more  than half of it in UK>  1 >.  Europe's venture capital is 
different from  that of the USA,  being more  dependent  on  financial 
institutions and  sometimes  on  government  and  less on  private initiative. 
Besides,  the  EC  venture capital market  is very fragmented  and  mostly 
domestic.  In the USA,  more  than a  quarter of the total comes  from 
foreign sources,  notably Europe.  The  average size of  investment  in 
1)  Statistics on  bankruptcies,  given  in  Table  xx  annexed 
indicate  that  the  number  of  liquidations  depends  not  only  on 
the  business  cycle  but  also  on  attitudes towards  risk. 
Where  no  business  failure  occurs,  companies  must  be  either 
consistently profitable  or  avoiding  big risks.  <Japan, 
Germany>  US,  UK  more  risk  takers. 
2>  Entrepreneurship  and  its  impact  on  US  economy,  Report  to 
the  President's  Commission  on  Industrial  Competitiveness, 
December  1984. 
1 >  "Venture  capital  in  Europe  1985"  A Peat-Harwick  Mitchell 
study  for  the  European  Venture  capital  Association,  August 
1985. (4) 
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Europe  is much  smaller than in the USA.  In addition,  the degree of 
transnational syndication is not yet sufficiently developed.2> 
Japan has been more  effective in competing against  large us  companies 
but has nevertheless important cultural constraints as it is not as 
respectable as in the US  to be  an  entrepreneur and  recruit talented 
management  from  the traditional corporations.  Japanese financial 
infrastructure is geared to the  larger firms  and  new  businesses have 
difficulties in obtaining finance  for their subsequent  needs.  MITI  is 
already g1vmg priorities to creating an  "entrepreneur-friendly" venture 
capital market  and  US  firms are already offering related services in 
Japan. 
2>  Progress  is however  evident  in  Europe,  where  ten  large 
firms  from  5  different  countries set  up  a  joint  finance 
company  <Euroventures>  in  1984  to  administer  some  funds. 
The  short  supply  of  risk  capital  in  Germany  has  also  brought 
into  the  market  a  number  of  new  venture  capital  companies 
<e.g.  Technoventure,  backed  by  Siemens,  Deutsche  Bank, 
Bayer,  Daimler-Benz  and  Mannesman>.  The  expanding  venture 
capital  in  the  EC  has  reached  in  1984  0.19%  of  the  GNP  on 
average,  while  in  the  US,  represents  0.41%  <in  decline>. 39 
3  e>  Capacity for  innovation 
The  capacity to innovate  is directly related to the profitability and 
the competitiveness of enterprises which,  together with entrepreneurship 
are the keys to exploiting new  ideas and  products and  contributing to 
structural adaptation.1 > 
The  positive attitudes of  Japanese  companies  towards  innovation are 
remarkable:  they are prepared to plan for  long-term development,  to 
improve  production methods,  to change  product  lines,  to exploit 
inventions commercially  2>  and  to redeploy-recycle workers better than 
the  US  and  than most  EC  companies.3> 
EC  countries do  have  a  major original research potential,  certainly 
higher than Japan  and  lower  than us.  As  an  indicator of basic research 
potential in the period 1950-1983  Japan had  only 3  Nobel  prize winners 
in the areas of physics,  chemistry,  physiology,  medicine  and  economics; 
EC  countries had  66  while  US  had  11~.  This is already a  reversal of the 
situation existing before the war,  where  most  Nobel  prize winners were 
from  European  countries.  Nevertheless,  an  important number  of prize 
winners  in the period 1950-1983  was  trained in Europe  and  then moved  to 
the US. 
Past development  as well as present characteristics and  dynamism  of 
Japanese  enterprises have  been  based  on  a  more  integrated technological 
innovation  including education,  technology transfer,  some  indigenous R & 
D,  commercialisation and  diffusion of technology and  products.  The 
social environment  and  consensus within the firm was  favourable to such 
policies.  The  Government  plays an  active role  in promoting development 
of  industrial  innovation,  interacting with  industry and  universities to 
help product development  <JRDC>. 
Although  there are differences in the patenting  systems~>, the 
evidence from  patents statistics is a  useful  illustration:  the number  of 
patents granted  in 1982  to residents per 100  000  in habitants is highest 
in Japan  <3~ followed  by  US  <16>  and  Germany-France,  but the  EC  average 
<8>  is much  lower.  On  the other hand,  the number  of patents originating 
in a  country but registered abroad  is very  low  in Japan  <7>,  and  US  (11> 
and  much  higher  in many  EC  countries:  Germany  <1~>.  France  <31>,  UK 
(36).  <see  Annex  on  patents Stats.  1982)  In fact,  it is not only the 
number  of patents registered in EC  countries that is insufficient,  but 
also the efficient exploitation of patent  information and  of 
1 >  COM<81  >  620  final  and  O.J.  L353/15  of  15.12.83 
2>  In  recent  surveys  by  the  European  Management  Forum, 
Japanese  firms  and  secondly  only  US  firms  are  most  capable  o 
bringing  product  innovation  to  market,  adopting  process 
innovation  and  implementing  management  techniques. 
3>  Structural  adaptation  in  Japan  is  done  in  a  controlled 
manner  with  industries  and  government,  without  allowing  a 
big  role  to  foreign  competitors,  unlike  the  US  and  the 
Community  where  market  forces  are  the  main  instrument  of 
renewal. 
~>  In  Japan  separate  patents  for  each  claim  are  granted, 
while  in  Europe  and  US,  a  patent  may  cover  more  than  one 
function. 40 
research.1 >  The  Japanese  and  Americans  have  a  leading know-how  in 
exploiting the data banks with patents.  This enhances  the  Japanese 
capacity to  introduce new  technology or  inventions from  abroad  <foreign 
technology>,  which  seems  to be  the result of successful policies rather 
than pure  luck. 
Indeed protection of  intellectual property is particularly important to 
Japanese policy.  Indicative of this pattern is the number  of 
applications registered by  large companies:  Toshiba alone,  in 1982, 
filed  about  14000  patent protection applications,  followed  by  firms  like 
Hitachi,  Matsushita Electric,  Fuyitsu,  Mitsubishi Electric etc.,  in a 
total of some  180000  applications.  Amongst  a  million patents filed 
world  wide  in 1980,  about  40%  were  Japanese.  2) 
This is a  reflection of  an  attitude,  which,  if continued,  will give 
Japan  a  net positive balance  in technology trade,  currently in deficit 
of more  than one  billion US$.  3).  It is the result of a  strategy 
based on  the establishment of a  patent network,  especially in the more 
promising technological fields,  which  in effect make  it difficult for 
competitors to enter the market. 
Another aspect of this strategy is that of collecting ideas from  other 
firms,  the end  result being the production of patentable products. 
Advantage  can therefore be  taken of the practice by  some  European  firms 
of non-lodgement  of patents.  The  strategy was  first used by  the 
Japanese at home  and  then became  an  international strategy.  The  number 
of patents lodged  by  Japanese  firms  operating abroad  almost doubled 
between  1972/75  and  1976/81.  This performance was  20%  higher than 
either the  US  or Germany. 
A direct relationship between  the number  of  Japanese patents on  export 
markets and  their  improved  position in these markets can therefore be 
detected:  filing of patents can  serve as an  advance  indicator of trading 
activities of competing countries. 
In comparison,  the European  environment  for  innovation is less 
favourable  for the following reasons: 
- fragmentation  of  EC  market  reduces  incentives for firms 
to  innovate  <effective demand  for  innovation weaker> 
inefficient use  of research funds  which  although 
important  <Tables  in annex  on  R&D  expenditure>,  do  not 
achieve  synergy  and  multiplier effects  <patents are a 
rough  indicator of  R&D  efficiency> 
fewer  researchers and  engineers per 1000  inhabitants, 
smaller proportion of  young  population receiving higher 
education. 
Innovation is an  important determinant of business adaptability,  not 
only through provision of new  products and  services but  also through  new 
production methods/processes.  Innovation in several cases fails to make 
a  practical  impact  if the new  products are not brought to market 
1 >  In  the  EC  the  Luxembourg  Convention  of  the  Community 
Patent  signed,  in  1975  which  will  offer  important  advantages 
to  industry,  has  not  yet  entered  into  force. 
2>  Source:  Japanese  patent  office 
3)  Source:  Commerzbank 41 
quickly,  thus capturing a  significant share.  This is particularly 
crucial for products with short life cycles,  where  as already discussed 
in preceding section,the speed of introduction determines profitability. 
<example:  body  scanner,  discovered  in Europe,  developed  and 
industrialised in USA  and  marketed  by  Japan> 42 
3.  f>  Characteristics specific  to  SME's 
The  factors  of  competitiveness  of  entreprises  evoked  in  the 
preceding  discussion  - strategies  of  entreprises,  finance, 
motivation,  management,  education,  entrepreneurship  and 
capacity  for  innovation  - concern  of  course  all  firms, 
regardless  of  size. 
Although  it is not  possible,  for  obvious  statistical reasons 
and  for  reasons  related  to  the  nature  of  SME's,  to  evaluate 
their contribution  to  the  competitiveness  of  Community 
industry,  it is clear that,  in  the  last  few  years,  they  have 
played  a  major  role  in  preserving  the  innovative  and  export 
capacity  of  the  Community,  either directly  or  indirectly 
through  subcontracting  for  the  large  entreprises. 
In  the  EC  95~ of  entreprises  are  SME's;  and  contribute  some 
50~ of  total  industrial  employment,  which  varies  for  the 
various  Member  States  from  43~ to  75~. 
It  is therefore  clear  that  the  preceding  remarks  do  not 
concern  any  specific  group  of  entreprises  exclusively.  A 
number  of  them,  nevertheless,  are  of  particular  importance 
for  the  SMEs 
SMEs  in  the  Community  show  in  general  higher 
flexibility  and  adaptability  to  changing  market  conditions 
SMEs  have  had  and  continue  to  have  difficulties related 
to  their size  in  the  areas  of  research  and  finance, 
especially  in  terms  of  access  to  risk  capital  needed  for  the 
necessary  investment  in  high  technology.  Furthermore,  they 
are,  by  nature,  more  sensitive  than  large  firms  to  the 
constraints  of  the  environment  and  to  the  costs  linked  to 
the  fragmentation  of  the  Common  market. and  of  the  costs  of 
penetration  of  external  markets. 
For  these  reasons  the  Commission  has  reviewed  the  situation 
of  SMEs  in  terms  of  tax  environment,  competition  policy, 
company  law,  Community  research  programmes  and  social 
environment  and  begun  work  which  takes  into  account  their 
special  features  and  in  all  Community  policies  and  which 
ensures  that  their  competitive possibilities are  favored  by 
a  maximal  relaxation  of  their  environmental  constraints. 
These  issues  will  be  the  subject  of  discussion  in  relevant 
documents  in  preparation  by  the  Commission's  services. III.  THE  OPPOSING  STRATEGIES 
The  foregoing  sections outlined  the general  industrial competitiveness 
trends  in the  Community  over  the last ten years  and  the main factors· 
determining  them. 
They all point  to  one  fact  :  European  industry's capacity to  compete 
has  been eroded,  even if this general verdict must  be qualified, 
depending  on  the Member  State,  industry or undertaking concerned. 
Naturally,  the undertakings  themselves  bear,  and  must  continue  to 
bear,  primary responsibility for  keeping  industry competitive. 
But it is equally clear  that their capacity to  do  so  over  the next 
ten years  is bound  up  with a  number  of constraints, most  of  them  imposed 
by  the environment  in which  they come  up  against their foreign 
competitors. 
To  ask how  to get a  grip on  these constraints does  not only mean  joining 
in the debate  on  government  intervention so  often evoked  when  considering 
an  individual State's or  the  Community's  industrial strategy  (1). 
On  the contrary,  the analyses  in the next  few  sections  show  that 
it is not  the relative importance  of  the  public and  private sectors which 
determines  the  success  of  an  economy  but,  more  simply,  the unity of all 
economic  operators  concerned  in their choice of objectives  and  in their 
efforts  to achieve  them. 
A look at the Community's  main rivals'  strategies in comparison 
with  the  situation in Europe  casts light on  these points 
Clearly,  what  is said  here  about  those  strategies  is  not 
meant  to  imply  that  they  are  an  example  to  be  followed, 
firstly  because  they  are  not  transferable  and  also,  more 
importantly,  because  they  do  not  necessarily  correspond  to 
the  Community's  own  objectives  and  in particular to  its 
concern  to  reconcile  the  striving for  economic  efficiency 
with  maintaining  and  developing  social  progress. 
(1)  Here  "industrial strategy" means  the strategy of  a  whole  economic 
entity and not just government policies within that entity. 44 
1.  JAPAN  A VOLUNTARIST  STRATEGY 
Numerous  studies have  attempted  to  explain the  secret of Japanese 
industry's  success over  the  last few  decades.  Cost  advantages  due  to 
different wage  and  working  conditions  than in the  USA  or  in the more 
prosperous  areas  of  the Community,  the  impenetrability of  the Japanese 
market for  imports,  and  industrial targeting are all often mentioned. 
This  communication is not  intended  to  add  one  more  chapter  to  the 
studies but,  instead,  to  show  the  implications of Japan's  industrial 
development  strategy for  the  Community. 
With  this in mind,  two  points must  be made  from  the outset  : 
most of  the Community  industries competing against Japanese 
rivals claim that  there is,  on average,  a  20-30%  gap  between 
production costs  in Japan and  in the  Community  (I).  Evidently, 
there is every chance  that  the  growth rate in the  Community  will 
remain  below Japan's until  this gap  is substantially narrowed; 
second,  only  two  factors  can explain this  gap  :  (i)  specific 
differences  between  the Japanese  and  Community  economies  and 
(ii)  the efficiency of European  firms  and  the  quality of  the 
environment  in which  they operate.  Accordingly,  the only way  to 
strike a  better balance will  be  to  take a  combination of  international 
relations measures  and  measures  to  improve  economic  efficiency 
within  the Community.  This  section is concerned primarily with 
the  second  set of measures,  though  lessons  can be  drawn  from  them 
for  the external relations  side  too. 
(I)  Figures  quoted  by  the  automobile  and  consumer  electronics  industry 
in particular.  Some  studies  give far higher  figures  for  the  gap 
between component  production costs. 45 
Above  all,  the  success of Japanese  industry can be attributed to 
a  combination of a  united  system  and  an efficient method. 
a)  Unity of  the  system 
Japanese  industry is not competitive in every area,  nor absolutely. 
The  bulk of of Japan's manufactured  goods  trade surplus,  with both the 
Community  and  the USA,  comes  from  a  few  fields in which Japan  is  the 
world  leader  (I). 
Consequently,  the question is not as much  why  Japan has  been  so 
successful  in the fields where it is clearly the most  competitive but 
more  why  and  how  it has  kept  foreign  rivals,  and  in particular European 
undertakings,  out of much  of its market,  even when  they are the best. 
Two  explanations  for  the apparent  impenetrability of  the  Japanese 
market are frequently put  forward  :  first,  social and  cultural factors 
which,  undeniably,  have  a  significant influence and,  second,  the 
undertakings'  export drive  (2). 
But  the principal reason probably lies in the unique  structure of 
the Japanese  economy. 
Structures  in the  Community  cannot  compare  with  the unity and 
concentration in Japan  (3). 
In an age  when  size is not only essential to  remain competitive, 
particularly in high-technology industries,  but also a  decisive means 
of controlling the market,  the unique  structure of  the Japanese economy 
gives it a  considerable advantage over its rivals. 
(I)  cf.  statistical annex 
(2)  cf.  Chapter II 
(3)  Of  course,  concentration does  not necessarily equal  efficiency 
and  the  situation in Japan clearly cannot  simply be  applied  to  the 
Community  as it stands. 46 
This  advantage  stems  from  : 
the exceptional  level  of  concentration in Japanese  industry  : 
of  the  top  ten industiral  groups  in the world,  six,  including all 
the  top  four  (Mitsubishi,  Sumitomo,  Mitsui and  DKB)  are Japanese 
three American  (Exxon,  GM  and  Mobil)  and  only one  European 
(Royal  Dutch Shell); 
this concentration is further heightened  by  the  pyramid 
structure of Japanese  industry,  where  65.5%  of all small  firms  work 
as  sub-contractors  (I)  and,  consequently,  depend  on  the big 
industrial groups  (2); 
what  is more,  even  these  large groups  have very close ties 
with the Japanese  trading agencies  ("sogo  sosha")  (3)  which handle 
over half of Japan's foreign  trade; 
finally,  they keep  a  very tight grip on Japan's  internal 
distribution network  :  between  70%  and  80%  of  the retail trade 
on  some  sectors of  the Japanese market  is channelled  through 
"captive" customers.  In  the  consumer  electronics  industry,  for 
example,  no  more  than  8%  of  the wholesale market  is  taken by 
independent wholesalers  and at most  35%  of  the retail market  is 
open  to foreign competitors  (4). 
(I)  I983  Ministry of  International Trade  and  Industry  (MITI)  White  Paper 
(2)  This  pyramid  structure enables Japanese groups  to  buy  their component 
supplies  from  firms  offering notoriously inferior wages  and  social 
welfare conditions. 
(3)  "Sago  shosha"  committee,  I982  :  in 1982,  53%  of Japan's exports  and 
62%  of its imports  were  channelled  through  the  "sago  shosha". 
(4)  UNICE  (Union of  the  Industries of  the European Community)  Working 
paper entitled "Principaux obstacles  aux  importations  sur le marche 
japonais"  (I985). 47 
Clearly,  under  these  circ~stances,  the Japanese  economy  is far more 
oligopolistic than its rivals. 
This unique  feature  does  not necessarily imply  competition  by 
Japanese  firms  on  their  home  market  is  any  less  fierce.  Indeed,  home  competition 
is one  of  the  fundamental  driving forces  behind Japanese  industry. 
But it does  offer the objective weapon  of  strong unity against 
competition from  abroad,  whether  on  the  home  or world  market  or on  the 
production,  distribution or foreign  trade  sides. 
Consequently,  this gives  Japanese  industry  the big advantage  of  a 
home  market  serving as  a  springboard  to  a  favourable  position on  the 
world market rather  than as  a  battlefield for·competitors  from  all over 
the  world. 
b)  Efficiency of  the method 
/ 
Just as much  as  the unity of  the Japanese  economy,  the  efficiency of  the 
undertakings'  and  public authorities'' method  of  promoting  industrial  and 
technological  development  in Japan has  been,  and  still is,  another key 
factor  in the  success  of  the  Japanese  economy. 
The  method  consists of  systematic cooperation between all parties 
concerned  (i.e.  industry,  government,  laboratories and  universities) 
to  set and  attain clearly defined  industrial and  technological  development 
objectives. 
This  goes  far  beyond  the  "industrial targeting" epithet  so  often 
attached  to  Japan's  industrial policy  since it does  not apply purely, 
nor  even primarily,  to  the public sector. 
Originally  the method  was  conceived 
restructuring and modernizing  industry. 
has  turned  into  a  system for  guiding  the 
economy. 
as  a  temporary  instrument for 
Little by  little, however,  it 
development  of  the  Japanese 
After initially focusing  on basic industries  (i.e. electrical 
engineering,  shipbuilding,  steel and  coal),  the  government  aid has 
subsequently been channelled  into  a  series of  strategic industries, 
starting with mechanical  engineering  and  electronics. 
Sectoral policies following  the  same  pattern have  also been 
introduced  for  the  car  and  petrochemical  industries. 
These  have  been backed up  by  more  general policies on  : 
the preparation of  scenarios  sharing  the  structural development 
prospects of  Japanese  industry; 
greater cooperation between  government  and  industry  ~n setting 
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intensified export promotion  campaigns,  and  in particular  the 
JETRO  (I)  scheme  and  the  tax  support for  exports  (e.g.  the 
4%-6%  tax deduction on  the value of  exports  or  the  50%  deduction 
on  export revenue). 
Japan  therefore has  a  fully-fledged,  comprehensive  industrial  and 
technological development  strategy based  on  a  concerted approach  looking 
beyond  specifically industrial policy measures  and  progressively including 
research,  education and  town  and  country planning. 
The  main measures  taken  to  implement  this policy have  been  : 
regular  surveys  of major  technological  developments  by  teams  of 
academics,  civil servants  and  business managers  (in  I971,  1976  and 
I982); 
industrial targets  based  on  the  findings  of  these  surveys,  e.g. 
giving priority to  the  electronics  industry in  1974,  the  aim  being 
to  pick out  the  industries with  the most  promising  growth prospects; 
projects  to  create  the right conditions  for  attaining  these 
objectives  :  ongoing projects  include  ones  on  office automation, 
telecommunications,  space,  and  industrial electronics.  The 
technologies essential for  the  future  are  identified  by  broad  field 
of  application in the  light of  the  industrial objectives  set,  the 
specifications are assessed  and  then  the  technologies  are developed 
in  the  field  by means  of  joint projects  by  teams  of undertakings 
formed  for  the duration of  the project only and  coordinated  and 
funded  by  the MITI. 
The  AIST  (Agency  for  Industrial Sciences  and  Technologies)  helps 
the MITI  to  coordinate and  organize  the  schemes,  all of  which are aimed 
directly at mastering  technologies  too  risky or  novel  for undertakings 
to  apply  immediately. 
Finally,  regular comparisons  of  the  state of  technological development 
in Japan  and  in rival countries are made  to gain a  picture of  the  chances 
of  transfering or acquiring  technologies  and  of  likely future  development 
priorities. 
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This policy is backed  up  by  : 
a  consistent education strategy; 
· a  patenting policy which has  gradually evolved  into a  key  industrial 
policy instrument  (I) 
.a new  "technopole"  (high-technology centre)  policy  to  combine 
industr~al strategy,  industrial development  pol~cy and  technological 
progress.  The  policy announced  by  the MITI  in  1980  consists of 
organ~z~ng industrial development  in Japan  into  (19)  fields, 
each with its own  clearly defined priorities plus  a  wide  range of 
highly attractive incentives  to  promote  them. 
Although similar  schemes  exist in the  USA  and  in the  Community, 
none  is on  the  same  scale or as  systematic as  the Japanese programme 
the  US  schemes  are regional ones  coordinated at Federal  level; 
the Community  has  fewer  schemes,  without  any  Community-level 
coordination  (ASTON  and  WARWICK  in the United  K:ingdom,  SOPHIA-
ANTIPOLIS  in France or HILDESHEIM  in Germany,  for  example). 
Japan's  comprehensive,  systematic  approach  to  industrial  and 
technological  development has  enabled it not only  to  catch up  with its 
rivals.in.many fields but actually to overtake  them  in strategic areas 
such as  optical fibres,  ceramics,  integrated circuits,  lasers,  etc. 
The  weaknesses  of  this strategy should also  be underlined,  for 
instance in shipbuilding and  aluminium,  which are currently undergoing 
severe difficulties in Japan. 
On  the  economic  and  industrial front,  this considerably reduces 
firms'  technological development  costs  and  lead  times. 
Some  Japanese firms'  technological  development  costs have  been cut 
to one-third  those of  their European competitors  and  their  lead  times 
to half  those of their rivals. 
(I)  cf.  chapter II,  3,  c so 
In  the final analysis,  Japan's  industrial  success  stems  from  a 
combination of  a  method  of  continuously adapting its technological 
strategy to its economic  and  industrial objectives  and  of  such a 
highly concentrated unified economy  that  the method  can be  used 
to  defend Japan's  interests against international competitors 
particularly effectively. 
But  we  must  temper  our  praise of  this  success,  and  of its uncontested 
impact  on  industrial growth  and  Japan's  trade  surplus,  with a  work 
about its social drawbacks. 
In practice,  Japan's  endeavours  to  improve  its industrial 
competitiveness  have  Led  it 
to  give  industrial development  greater priority than its 
rivals over  envitonmental  conservation and  improvements  in non-
monetary aspects  of  the  standard of  living  (e.g.  quality of life, 
social  infrastructure,  etc;); 
to attach little importance  to  social welfare  :  Japan's 
pension~ickness insurance and  unemployment  benefit  systems  lag 
far behind  the  Community's, 
·to develop  a  two-tier economy,  leaving  a  substantial proportion 
of  the active population working  with little security for  wages 
far  below  those paid  by  the  large undertakings.  Above  all,  this 
provides  large undertakings  with a  network  of  low-wage  subcontractors 
and  perpetuates  the very  low productivity levels  in vast sectors 
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2.  AMERICAN  ASPIRATIONS 
Japan's fast  growth is not  the only industrial challenge facing  the 
Community. 
In addition,out of  concern at the threat  to its technological 
leadership  and  at the  increasing market  penetration by  Japanese 
products,  the  United  States of  America  has  progressively pieced 
together an  economic  and  industrial recovery  strategy which,  likewise, 
could undermine  Europe's  position in the world  economy. 
The  basic  idea behind  this  strategy has  many  points  in common 
with  the  ideas  on  the development  of  European  industry set out  in 
chapter I. 
But  the  Community  and  the Member  States must  pay particular 
attention to  the means  and  instruments  employed. 
A.  Fiercer competition between  the  USA  and  Japan 
Most  of  the numerous  assessments  of  the competitiveness  of  US 
industry made  over recent years  (I)  have  reached  two  main conclusions 
first,  that  US  industry's competitiveness  is being  eroded, 
particularly in high-technology industries;  and 
Second,  that  the main  challenge  to  the  USA  is posed  by  Japan 
and  the Pacific region,  not  by  Europe. 
(I)  cf.  in particular,  - "US  competitiveness  in high-technology industries", 
US  Department  of  Commerce,  I983 
The  report  of  the President's  Commission  on 
Industrial competitiveness,  January  I985. 52 
The  main explanations or  signs  of  this  loss of  competitiveness 
to  emerge  from  these various  studies are  : 
the  slow  increase  in labour productivity  (only  I.2%  per  annum 
in the  USA  between  I960  and  I983,  compared  with almost  6%  in 
Japan and  over  5%  in Korea); 
the  USA's  deteriorating balance of  trade,  with the deficit 
widening  over  the  last ten years  to  US  S I23.3  thousand million 
in  I984,  of  which  US  i  36.8  thousand million was  attributable 
to  trade with Japan; 
declining market  share,  particularly in high-technology 
industries  :  according  to  the President's  Commission  report,  US 
industry has  lost market  share  in seven high-technology  industries 
out of  ten over  the  last few  years  (I); 
insufficient,  poorly coordinated civil research and  development, 
particularly from  the  point of view of manufacturing  technologies 
and  the  link between research and  commercial  and  industrial 
spin-offs; 
backwardness  in spreading  automated production processes. 
Although  there  is no  need  to  go  into all the details of  these 
analyses,  which  are very similar  to  those  conducted  in Europe,  two 
fundamental  points must  be  remembered  : 
:-~  First, all  these  studie~ distinctly conclude  that  the main 
threat  to  US  competitiveness  emanates  from  Japan and  the  newly-
industrializing Pacific countries but not  from  the  Community,  a 
judgment which  either underestimates  the  Community's  development 
potnetial or  is a  realistic,  but perturbing assessment; 
Second,  neither  the scale nor  the  single-mindedness  of 
the USA's  efforts  to  safeguard  its industrial  and  technological 
leadership  should  be  underestimated. 
It is worth  taking  a  closer  look at the·main components  of  the 
USA's  approach. 
(I)  See  also  Mr.  Delmas's  January  I984  report entitled "Reflexions  sur 
'1a  competition nippo-americaine  dans  les hautes  technologies'' 
(Reflections  on  competition between  Japan and  the  USA  on high 
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B.  America's  response 
The  panoply  of  measures  by  the  US  authorities to restore  the 
competitiveness  of  US  industry  fall  into  six  main 
categories  :  impact  of  the  public deficits,  tax  policy, 
civil  and  military research,  industrial  cooperation,  trade 
policy  and  deregulation. 
The  rapid  growth  in the  USA  in  1983  and  particularly  in 
1984,  achieved  in  the  main  at  the  expense  of  large  public 
and  external deficits speeded  up  the  process  of  adjustment 
in  US  industry  and  helped  the profitability of  investment  in 
that  industry. 
Tax  policy  is used  as  an  instrument  to  restore  the 
competitiveness  of  US  industry.  At  the  heart  of this policy 
lie  investment  incentives,  and  in particular the  1981 
Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act  which  introduces  tax  credits 
investments,  exceptional  depreciation  terms  and  20%-50% 
reduction  in  capital  gains  tax.  Apart  from  the  direct 
impact  <an  upswing  in  investment  despite  high  real  interest 
rates>,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  effects of  these  measures 
has  been  the  boom  in  the  venture  capital  supply,  which  has 
virtually doubled  since  the  new  rules  were  imposed. 
'  Three points connected with civil and military research must 
be  stressed  : 
i)  the general research and  development  revival  in the  USA. 
Following  I960-I979  decline,  the percentage of  GDP  spent on RID 
in the  USA  has  recovered  to almost  2.8%,  the highest in the world. 
Although  the large part played by military research  (0.9 point) 
has raised doubts  about  the  efficiency on  the R&D,  its dimensions 
coupled with the concomitant economies  of scale undeniably give 
the  USA  a  considerable advantage  over its competitors  (in  I985  the 
USA  will invest more  in R&D  than Germany,  Japan and  France  combined); 
ii)  the  launching of  the Strategic Defence Initiative  (SDI) 
programme  will further  increase  the  scale,  coordination and 
industrial spin-offs of  US  military research  (I); 
iii) the  impetus  given  to  inter-firm cooperation on  research, 
particularly by  the  I984 National  Cooperative Research Act  to 
relax the anti-trust legislation on precompetitive research 
agreements  and  by  the  RDLP  (Research and  Development Limited 
Partnership)  support  to help  finance  such operations  (with 
investors' profits being  taxed,  like capital gains,  at 20%). 
According  to  the  US  Department  of Commerce,  US  ~ 2  000  million 
has  been invested in RDLP  since  the  legislation was  adopted 
in  I982  (2). 
Consequently,  US  research in general .can be  expected  to have 
an  even greater impact on  industry than in the past.  Combined 
with the  tightening-up of  the USA's  transfer of  technology policy, 
this could have  far-reaching  consequences  for  industry in Europe. 
(1}  cf.  The  Commission  communications  entitled "Towards  a  European 
Technological  Community",  COM(85)500final  and  COM(85)350final. 
(2)  cf.  Economic  impact  I985/2 (S) 
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Industrial cooperation between US  and  Japanese undertakings 
has  spread  from  the car industry  (1)  to many  other sectors,  and 
in particular to high-technology industries.  The  agreements 
between General  Motors  and  FANUC  on  computer-integrated 
manufacture  (2),  between  IBM,  NEC  and  NTT  on  integrated circuits 
and  telecommunications  and  between Fujitsu and  Amdahl  on 
computers are the most  outstanding examples. 
Of  course,  Community  undertakings  have  also been reaching 
similar agreements with Japanese  and  American  firms.  What  is 
striking however,  is the  scale and  depth of  this cooperation between 
Japanese and  US  firms.  The  potential danger  for  the Community 
lies is  the possible emergence  of hyper-competitive companies 
marrying  the  technological knowhow  of  the Americans  with  the 
productive efficiency of  the  Japanese. 
Lastly,  the  deregulation  of  the  US  economy, 
particularly  in  the  transport,  telecommunications  and 
financial  services sectors,  has  been  under  way  for  a  number 
of  years.  It  is regarded  by  some  as  one  of  the  main 
stimulants  to  the  services sector  in  the  USA.  This  does  not 
prevent  certain misgivings  being  voiced  in  the  USA  about 
some  of  its implications,  particularly  in  terms  of  the 
abolition  of  certain services,  a  lowering  of  safety 
standards  <in  the  transport  sector,  for  instance>  and  the 
development  of  private oligopolies. 
The  pace  of  innovation  in  the  financial  services sector  has 
also  picked  up,  giving  birth to  a  wide  range  of  new  customer 
services.  This  trend  has  further  boosted  the  key  role  played 
by  services  in  the  US  economy  < the  services sector 
generates  over  two-thirds  of  America's  GDP  according  to  the 
Department  of  Com~erce's "1985  US  industrial  outlook">. 
It  is important  to  note  the efforts made  by  the  USA 
to  strengthen its trade policy by  defending  the  industries hardest 
hit by  foreign  competition  (e.g.  steel,  textiles, etc.)  and 
promoting  the interests of  the  sunrise industries both in 
internatioal  trade organizations  (such as  the  GATT  debate on  the 
liberalization of  trade  in services)  and  in America's bilateral 
relations  (e.g.  thenegotiations on  the opening-up  the Japanese 
telecommunications market). 
This  summary  of  the  broad  lines of  the  US  policy for  sustained 
industrial recovery clearly illustrates America's aspirations  and  needs. 
It is esserttial not  to underestimate  how  effective this policy 
could  be 
For  one  thing because it has  already begun  to  have  a  tangible 
impact,  particularly on  the high-technology firms; 
For another,  because it could  combine  the benefits of general 
measures  to revitalize industry and  industrial  targeting  to  allow 
preciser,  more  clearly focused  management  of defence  research. 
(1)  Cf.  "Structure and  prospects of  the European automobile  industry" 
COM(81)317final 
(2)  "Advanced  manufacturing  equipment  in the Community"  COM(85)112final. 55 
3.  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  PACIFIC  REGION 
In addition to  Japan's  and  the  USA's  declared  intent  to  strenghten· 
their  share of  the  international division of  labour,  in the years  to 
come  the  Community  will  increasingly be  up  against  a  third force  -
the newly-industrializing Pacific countries. 
Most  experts predict that  they will notch up  the  highest growth 
rates over  the next  ten years  (e.g.  4%  projected real  annual  gro\Jth 
up  to  2000  according  to  the  Japanese  Economic  Planning Agency). 
But  there is a  danger  that  the  Community  could  be  particularly 
prone  to  the competition from  these new  trading partners because  : 
their growth  is very  largely export-led,  whilst  their home 
markets  remain heavily protected; 
their  t~pe of  industriil  specialization  has  more  in  common 
with  that  o~ the  Community,  than  with  that  of  USA  or  Japan. 
Two  fundamental  factors must  be  taken  into account  by  the  Community 
first,  the  implications  of  these countries'  policies,  Korea  probably 
being  the most  striking example,  and,  second,  the potential  consequences 
of  the  emergence  of  a  Pacific axis. 
A.  The  Korean  example 
Korea's  per capita  GDP  rose  by  an  average of  6.5%  per  annum  between 
1965  and  1983  and  its exports  by  almost  15%  per  annum  from  1973  to 
1983. 
Naturally,  these  exceptional  performances must  be  seen in the 
context of  the  low  base  from  which Korea  started.  But  they also reflect 
a  policy which  could  have  rapidly growing  implications  for  the  Community. 
In  the final analysis,  the Korean  economy's  remarkable  progress 
is based  on  a  highly voluntarist industrial  strategy which has 
increasingly upset  the  balance of world  trade. 56 
This  strategy consists of  a  combination of  : 
a  heavily protected internal market,  despite  the  recent 
liberalization measures,  and  a  deliberate policy of  buying Korean 
products  to  replace  imports.  There  are still complete  import  bans 
on  a  wide  range of  products;  even  in  1988  products  such as 
automobiles  and  a  large choice of  consumer  goods  will still be 
either  subject  to  quantitative restrictions or purely and  simply 
banned.  What  is more,  no  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  imports 
qualify for  the  "normal"  20%  customs  tariff; 
·intense  industrial concentration  :  no  more  than 50  industrial 
groups  ("chaebol",  equivalent  to  the  "zaibatsu"  in Japan)  virtually 
control  the entire Korean  economy;  eight  trading  companies 
(SAMSUNG,  HYUNDAI,  DAEWOO,  SUNKYONG,  LUCKY  GOLDSTAR,  SSANGYONG, 
HYOGUNG  and  KUMBO)  handle over half Korea's  exports  (1); 
a  privileged position in  terms  of  the  comparative  advantages 
stemming  from  Korea's  favourable  productivity-to-wages  ratio rlus 
the opportunity  to  use  modern  technologies  thanks  to  the very 
highly-educated population by  the  standards  of  a  country at this 
stage of development 
heavy  interventon by  the public authorities which have 
adopted  a  highly "dirigiste" approach,  using administrati:ive 
measures  and  financial  controls  to  back up  their chosen  industries. 
However  clearly this rapid  growth  is  the Pacific has  boosted  world 
economic  growth  and  progress,  the fact  remains  that  the means  employed 
could  change  the  international division of  labour  in a  way  which could 
have  a  significant  impact  on  the position of  industry in the  Community. 
The  emergence,  day  by  day,  of  developed  countries  is  the Pacific 
could  heighten the  impact. 
(1)  cf.  "Problemes  economiques",  1984;  Financial Times,  August  19th,  1985. 57 
B.  The  emergence of  the Pacific axis 
According  to  the report by  the  US  President's Commission  on 
Industrial Competitiveness,  US  trade with the Pacific countries 
already overtaken US  trade with Europe  and  will be  double it by 
if current  growth rates are sustained. 
has 
1995 
These  are  symptoms  not only of  the  emergence of  a  new  centre of 
world  economic  activity but also of  the  special ties between  the 
Pacific countries  and  the  USA. 
Looking  beyond  the  figures,  the  Community  must  ask  : 
If  the Pacific countries are going  to  take  a  growing  share 
of  the world market  in the years ahead,  what  can be  done  to  ensure 
adequate outlets for  European  industry on heavily protected 
markets  against competitors with a  series of big advantages 
over European  firms  for historical  (Japan)  or geographical  reasons 
(proximity  to  the  USA); 
How  can it respond  to  the newly-industrializing countries, 
growth and  its impact  on cmmpetition on  the world market,  both 
in terms  of  the direct effect of  exports  from  those countries 
on  the world market  and  of  the possible shift towards  a  new  division 
of  labour within  the Pacific region,  a  trend which already  seems 
to  have  started and  which  would  further consolidate  the Pacific 
countries'  competitive position ?  Japan is already gaining 
most  from  this growth  in  the Asian countries,  to which it can 
sell capital goods  and  components  in return for  raw materials and 
food.  In this way  it is helping  to  ,speed  up  the  growth of  their 
exporting  industries  and  at the  same  time  expanding  those branches 
of  its economy  which are complementary  to  its near neighbours'. 
The  chief  problem  for  industry in the  Community  is,  therefore,  to 
avoid  succumbing  to  the fiercer competition aroused  by  the  emergence 
of  these newly-industrializing countries without being able  to  exploit 
the  advantages  of  their new  markets. 
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IV.  THE  COMMUNITY  AWAKENING 
After managing  a  respectable economic  performance over  the last 
twenty years despite its natural  and  historical handicaps,  the 
Community  is now  confronted with  a  particularly tense  international 
industrial situation. 
Now  that its comparative  advantages  have  been  eroded  and it has 
failed fully to  exploit  the potential offered  by  the diversity within 
the  Community,  the  Community  must withstand  leading rivals pursuing 
determined strategies posing  a  serious challenge  to  the future of 
industry in the Community. 
But various  shifts in European firms'  and  governments'  industrial 
policies indicate that the  Community  has,  beyond  question,  woken  up. 
It is clear from  the  foregoing  sections  that industrial  strategy 
does  not mean  action by  the public authorities alone.  Japan's  success 
the USA's  recovery and  the emergence of new  powers  in the Pacific region 
cannot all be  put down  solely to  the national policies being  pursued 
in the countries  concerned. 
Above  all,  they are  the result of  a  united approach by all 
economic  operators  to  promote  industrial development.  In practice, 
this unity implies  uc~epting a  given industrial priority and  the 
adoption of more  clearly-defined growth  targets,  whether  by  companies 
or ·governments. 
Comparison of  the  Community's  and  the Member  States'  industrial 
practices with those  of  their rivals  shows  that considerable progress 
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PROGRESS  BY  INDUSTRY  IN  EUROPE 
Naturally,  no  brief  analysis  of  changes  in  industrial 
practice  in  the  Community  can  give  any  more  than  an 
extremely  incomplete  picture  of  the  true  situation. 
Nevertheless,  close  examination  of  the  guiding principles 
behind  the  government  measures  and  companies'  decisions  over 
the  last  few  years  shows  a  marked  convergence  which  has 
revitalized  industry  in  Europe. 
But  two  preliminary  remarks  must  be  made  : 
a>  All  major  industrialised  countries  intervene  to  promote 
industrial  development  through  a  wide  variety  of  financial 
and  other  instruments.  Contrary  to  what  some  of  the 
Community's  leading  trading  partners  sometimes  say,  the 
influence  of  state support  for  industry  in  the  Community  is 
not  unsimilar  to  that  of  its main  industrialised rivals. 
In  Japan  while  the  public  sector  may  pay  less direct 
financial  support  to  industry  in  general  there  is  a  vey 
precise,  determined  strategy  to  target  public  aid  on  growth 
industries.  The  aid  is concentrated  on  short-term  market-
oriented  projects  and  has  thus  had  a  big  impact  on  the 
competitiveness  of  Japanese  firms  on  world  market. 
In  the  USA  the  emphasis  has  been  on  a  general  "horizontal" 
industrial  promotion  policy  with  almost  50%  of  US  industrial 
aid  in  1982  being  spent  on  general  purposes  (38%  on 
investment  aid  and  40%  on  Rand  D aid>.  Moreover  in  the  USA 
there  are  major  industrial  spin-offs  from  the  defence  and 
space  exploration  programmes. 
In  the  Community  public  financial  support  for  industry 
serves  a  number  of  broad  policy  objectives.  In  recent  years 
there  has  been  considerable  emphasis  on  the  need  to 
restructure  outdated  and  uncompetitive  industrial 
structures.  Sectoral  measures  aimed  at  rationalising certain 
declining  industries  have  been  accompanied  by  more  general 
measures  designed  to  promote  R  and  D,  and  the  introduction 1 
new  technologies.  This  adjustment  process  has  now  largely 
been  completed  and  in  most  Member  States there  is  a  clear 
shift  away  from  sectoral  schemes  and  towards  more  general 
measures  of  industrial  development.  There  has  been  a  marked 
increase  in  the  share  of  public  financa  for  industry  being 
channelled  into  R  and  D  in  recent  years.  In  the  Community 
industrial  aid  also  serves  important  regional  and  social 
objectives.  Incentives  to  firms  to  locate  their activities 
in  less-developed  regions  compensate  for  the  extra costs 
incurred  there  and  make  an  important  contribution  to  the 
economic  life  of  the  regions  concerned.  Several  Member 
States have  also  introduced  temporary  employment  maintenance 
and  job  creation  schemes  in  an  effort  to  overcome  high 
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b>  Second,  public sector  financial  support  is clearly not 
the  only  aspect  to  be  considered  when  assessing  the  level  of 
industrial  support  granted  by  the  individual  economic 
powers.  In  any  more  general  assessment  of  whether  European, 
American  or  Japanese  companies  have  the  most  favourable 
climate  to  operate  in,  many  factors  suggest  that  European 
firms  are  far  from  the  best-placed.  In  practice,  the  total 
public-sector financial  "support"  received  by  Community 
firms  is drastically reduced  by  the  extra costs  incurred  as 
a  result  of  the  inadequate  integration  of  the  European 
market  <which  some  calculations put  at  at  least  2%  of  the 
Community's  GDP  1  ,  or  more  than  the  total  financial  support 
paid  to  industry>. 
Setting  out  from  these  two  general  premisses,  four  factors 
indicate  that  industry  in  Europe  is  making  significant 
progress  <i>  the  convergence  of  the  national  policies to 
create  a  more  favourable  environment  for  industry,  <ii>  the 
development  of  European  policies,  <iii>  the  strengthening  of 
industrial  cooperation  not  only  inside  the  Community  but 
also  with  countries  outside  and  <iv>  greater  involvement  of 
the  two  sides  of  industry. 
A.  Re-drawing  of  national  policies to  create  a  more 
favourable  environment  for  industry 
Two  points  support  this  view  : 
Firstly,  following  the  general  increase  in State 
intervention  by  all  industrialized countries  over  the  last 
ten  years,  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  are  now 
showing  determination  to  move  towards  greater  competition. 
Secondly,  while  continuing  to  serve  social  and  regional 
objectives,  state support  priorities have  gradually  been 
shifting  from  declining  industries  to  growing  ones,  while  at 
the  same  time  State  support  schemes  have  been  made  more 
transparent  and  the  procedures  simplified. 
B.  The  development  of  European  policies 
Although  the  Community  authorities'  funding  of  industry 
remains  extremely  limited  <less  than  1%  of  the  national 
support>,  two  important  points  must  be  noted  : 
On  the  one  hand,  European  policies  are  doing  more  to 
help  industrial  development;  strengthening  the  internal 
market,  developing  joint research  projects  such  as  the 
ESPRIT,  RACE,  BRITE,  EUREKA  programmes  1)  ,  organizing 
transnational  exchanges  between  industry  and  universities, 
diverting  Community  aid  from  declining  industries  towards 
1  cf.  the  1984  report  from  Mr.  Albert  and  Mr.  Ball  to  the 
European  Parliament  on  progress  towards  economic  recovery  in 
Europe  in  the  1980s 
1  COM(84)305final;  COM<84)608final;  COM<85)113final 61 
growing  ones,  just  like  at  national  level,  paying  greater 
attention  to  industrial priorities  in  macroeconomic 
recommendations  2>  and  implementing  the  Community's 
competition policy  on  research  and  development  3)  . 
On  the  other  hand,  a  broad  consensus  is gradually 
emerging  between  economic  operators  to  take  greater  account 
of  the  European  dimension  in  their national  policies  and 
business strategies.  In  the  latter case  there  has  been  a 
remarkable  increase  in  the  number  of  joint positions  adopted 
by  European  industrialists to  this effect  <e.g.  the  round 
table  of  European  industrialists,  by  the  Group  of  12  on 
information  technology  and  by  big  European  firms  proposing 
measures  to  strengthen  the  internal  market>  and  in 
undertakings'  decisions  which  have  immediately  been  put  into 
effect,  e.g.  to  set  up  European  venture  capital 
associations,  the  growth  of  industrial  cooperation  outlined 
below  and  so  forth. 
c.  Strengthening  industrial  cooperation  between  firms 
inside  and  outside  Europe 
A growing  number  of  increasingly  far-reaching  agreements  are 
being  concluded  not  only  in  traditional sectors  such  as  the 
car  industry  but  also  in  new  industries,  whether  in  the  form 
of  State-backed  research  programmes  such  as  the  ESPRIT 
programme  or  of  purely  private  initiatives.  Agreements  such 
as  the  one  on  digital  telephone  exchanges  between  Italtel, 
CIT-Alcatel,  Siemens  and  Plessey  or  the  project  to  set  up  a 
pan-European  electronics  components  undertaking  are  both 
examples  of  this trend. 
D.  Greater  involvement  of  the  two  sides  of  industry 
Changing  attitudes  on  the  part  of  the  workforce  and  a  new 
cooperation  between  the  two  sides  of  industry  have  also 
contributed  to  the  progress  made  by  European  industry. 
Three  factors  can  be  mentioned  in  particular 
the  greater  emphasis  being  placed  on  training  and 
adapting  it more  closely to  the  needs  of  industry  and  to  the 
new  technologies, 
participation  in  the  changes  taking  place  in  industrial 
organization,  especially  when  new  technologies  are 
introduced,  and 
a  commitment  to  more  frequent  dialogue,  directed  to  a 
greater  extent  towards  finding  of  satisfying both  industry's 
requirements  and  social  needs. 
2  Annual  Economic  Report,  1984-85  <COM<84)587final 
3  Cf.  14th  Annual  Report  on  Competition  Policy 62 
Together,  these  four  general  trends  show  that all sectors  of 
the  Community  economy  are  now  aware  of  the  importance  of 
industrial  development  to  Europe's  economic  and  social future  and  have 
done  all that  they  can  to  adopt  policies  which  will  promote 
it. 
That  leaves  two  problems,  however  - the  scale  of  action  and 
resources  needed  to  counterbalance  the  Community's  main 
rivals'  policies  and  how  Europe  can  exploit  its inherent 
assets  and  thus  strengthen its competitive  position  on  world 
markets. STATISTICAL  ANNEX 
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ANNEX  1 
Total Private Services:  Share  of  World  Export~  (percentage)· 
!959/GO  1959/70  .1979/80 
B  ,  ~  / 1  b  ·  e_g_um  ~uxem ourg  3.5  3,6m  5,9m 
Den."'t\.ark  2.7  2.4  2.9 
:.'r.'\nce  8.9  10.2  13.0 
West  Germany  9.9  10.0  12.4 
Greece  o.s  0.9  1.7 
!re:anc.  .1. 0  0.7  0.4 
!t.a:Ly  8.6  9.3  8.7 
!'ethe:-!ands  5.4  5.7  7.1 
•:n!  ~~c  K:.n~com  22.9t  15.2  13.8 
:'ortugal  o.sv  o.e  o.a 
Spa:..:-1  1.8  4.8  4.9 
Canaca  s.o  4.9  2.9 
~<\pan  2.6  5.5  7.6 
Swi~zerlanc  4.on  0  3.8n  3.sn 
'  I  I, 
'  .... !'15.. t.ed  States  22.4  21.0  14.4 
Ouelle:  N,  Oulton,  International Trade  in Services  and  tho 
Comparative  Advantage  of  EC  Countries,  a.a.o.,· s.  185/19B6. Diversity of  economic  development  (GOP/per  capita) 
------·---------------- ------------
Weighted  cofficient  of  variation  in  GOP  per  capita 
1973 
EUR  6  0.10 
EUR  9  0.10 
EUR  12  0.17 
Coefficient  of  variation =  6 
X 
1981  1983 
0.10  0.11 
0.11  0.11 
0.19  0.19 
,  where  6  if the  standard deviation weighted  by  total population and 
x  the  Community  average 
Source  :  Calculated on  basis of  National  Accounts  ESA  1960-1983;  EUROSTAT 
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ANNEX  4 
Change 
-13.5 
- 9.8 
-----~--------------------------------------------------------------------------
GR  91.4  65.3  -26.1 
8  88.~  73.8  -14.2 
I  85.7  80.7  - s.o  -- IRL  85.7  62.5  -23.2 
F  81.7  61.5  -20.2 
EUR  10  64.3  41 • 5  -22.8 
··-------~ 1_. 
G  55.7  51 . 1  - 4.6 
UK  50.2  -17.8  -68.0 
NL  22.9  7.0  -15.9 
USA  16.9  12.0  - 4.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source  EUROSTAT  and  International  Energy  Agency ANNEX  5 
Wage  costs  and  productivity  in  industry 
(average  annual  growth  rate 1973-82) 
High-demand  Medium-demand  Low-demand  I 
sectors  sectors  sectors  I 
I 
w<15  PC2)  cc35  wc15  PC2)  c(3)  W(1)  P(2)  c  <35 I 
I 
EUR  2,7  4.3  -1.5  3.1  2.7  0.4  2.4  2.2  0.1  I 
USA  1.3  2.0  -0.8  0.9  0.5  0.4  1.1  1.1  -o.o  I 
JAPAN  3.8  11.3  -6.7 
(1)  Real  per  capita wages 
(2)  Per  capita productivity 
4.6  5.8  -1.1  4.0  3.6 
(3)  Real  unit  wage  costs, i.e.  real  wage  costs  per  unit  output  in 
national  currency  Creal  per  capita wages  over  productivity) 
Source  EUROSTAT  and  Commission  departments 
0.4  I (6) 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Cumulative 
reduction 
over  the 
period 
Unit  wage  cost  trends  in  industry 
Real  wage  costs/unit 
output  in national 
currency 
EUR  USA  JAPAN 
-0.6  -0.5  -4.4 
-2.7  -5.2  -1.2 
-3.7  -1.4  -3.8 
-2.3  -1.8  -1.1 
-9.1  -8.7  -10.1 
ANNEX  6 
Relative  unit  wage 
costs  in  the 
same  currency 
EUR  USA  JAPAN 
-3.7  11.6  -14.6 
-3.6  2.7  8.6 
-8.4  10.7  0.9 
-3.4  6.8  -1.7 
-17.9  35.5  -8.0 
1  Defined  as  real  wages  (per  capita  wages  multiplied  by  the  gross  national 
product  deflator),  divided by  per capita productivity 
2  Wage  costs  per  unit  output  in  common  currency  (US  dollars)  in  relation 
to the  weighted  average  for  the  top  19  competitors. 
Source  :  Commission  departments ANNEX  7 
Rate  of  investment  in  industry 
r 
I  '\ 
VI  \JA. 
·,  \ 
!  ·\ 
:'0  :  I  .  ,---"  \  I  "  \  I  '  \ 
'--- i  I 
I"" 
\  I 
1t;  \ \./ 
1973  75  :-.  - _80  .. ____  _  19t5 ANNEX  8 
Gross  fixed  capital  formation  in  industry 
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es Source 
Domestic  demand  trends,  in volume  (1973-82) 
average  annual  growth  rate 
(at  1975  prices and  exchanges  rates> 
EUR 
High-demand  sectors  I  5,2 
Electr1cal  and  electronics  hardware  3,7 
Information  technology,  office automation 
and  precision equipment  8,9 
Chemicals  and  pharmaceuticals  i  5,5 
Medium-demand  sectors  1,9 
Rubber  and  plastics 
I  3,2 
Transport  !  3,2 
Paper,  packaging  1,8 
Food,  beverages  and  tobacco  2,0 
Industrial machinery  0,2 
Low-demand  sectors  0,2 
M1scellaneous  products  1,3 
Textiles,  leather and  clothing  0,2 
USA 
4,8 
5,5 
5,7 
3,7 
4,8 
5,0 
1,4 
2,9 
1,7 
3,2 
0,5 
1,8 
1,5 
Steel  and  metallic ores  0,7  -0,7 
Metal  goods  -o,s  0,0 
Construction materials,  non-
metallic ores  0,9  0,3 
TOTAL  INDUSTRY  1,9  2,3 
Eurostat  and  Commission  departments 
ANNEX  9 
Japan  Total 
3  zones 
13,5  6,7 
15,1  7,7 
6,8  7,0 
11,8  6,4 
5,2  2,5 
1.,2  3,5 
7,1  2,9 
3,7  2,6 
3,8  2,2 
3,6  2,0 
3,0  1,1 
1,4  1,5 
2,7  1,2 
3,7  1,3 
4,2  1,2 
1,8  1,0 
6,4  3,1 
..  --. Dimensions  of  the  home  market  in  1982 
(in  constant  purchasing  power) 
EUR  USA 
High-demand  sectors  32,7  42,1 
Electr1cal  and  electronics  hardware  31,6  42,5 
Information  technology,  office automation 
prec1s1on  equipment  28,4  ·53' 9 
Chemicals  and  pharmaceuticals  34 '8  38,2 
Medium-demand  sectors  39,0  44,5 
Low-demand  sectors  37,1  35,1 
TOTAL  37,0  40,7 
Source  :  ~urostat and  Commission  departments 
Note  Internal  market  =output +imports- exports  1\ 
ANNEX  10 
Japon  Total 
3  zones 
25,5  100 
26,4  100 
18,1  100 
26,7  100 
16,8  100 
27,5  100 
22,3  100 Export  market  share  (1983) 
EUR  USA 
Percentage  Percentage 
change  change 
between  1983  between  1983 
1973-1983  %  1973-1983  % 
High-demand  sectors  -2.5  25.6  +2.7  20.4 
Electrical  and 
electronics  hardware  -1.8  23.7  +2.4  20.2 
Information  technologies, 
office automation  and 
precision  equipment  -5  17  .  +5  27.4 
Chemicals  and  pharma-
ceuticals  -1  30.8  +1.9  17.6 
Medium-demand  sectors  -1.2  25.8  -0.3  18.5 
Low-demand  sectors  +4.1  29.4  +1.0  9.2 
TOTAL  INDUSTRY  26.6  16.9 
Source  :  Eurostat  and  Commission  departments 
Percentage  change  difference  between  1973  market  share 
and  1983  market  share. 
ANNEX  11 
JAPAN 
Percentage 
change 
between  1983 
1973-1983  % 
+5.6  18.8 
+11.4  29.1 
+8  23 
+0.5  7.8 
+6.1  15.3 
+1.4  13.4 
15.9 X 
18 
High  demand 
16. 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
/·-....-·--.  /·-·-.--
I,  ........ 
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ANNEX  12 
Penetration  rate 
(total  imports  as  a  proportion of  domestic  demand) 
at  current  prices 
Medium  demand  Low  demand 
18"  - 18 
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Penetration  rate  industrial  products  on  the  interhal  market 
EUR  USA 
Percentage  Percentage 
change  change 
between  1982  between  1982 
1973-1982  %  1973-1982  % 
High-demand  sectors  +7.9  17.3  +5.9  11.5 
Electrical  and 
electronics  hardware  +10.9  19.1  +6.7  15.5 
Information  technologies, 
office automation  and 
precision  equipment  +14.7  33.6  +4.5  14.1 
Chemicals  and  pharma-
ceuticals  +3.6  11.8  +2.9  6.8 
Medium-demand  sectors  +1.8  8.5  +2.3  8.0 
Low-demand  sectors  +3.8  12.8  +4.2  11.2 
TOTAL  INDUSTRY  +3.6  11.6  +3.4  9.5 
Source  :  Eurostat  and  Commission  departments 
Note  Penetration  rate = imports 
domest1c  demand 
JAPAN 
Percentage 
change 
between  1982 
1973-1982  % 
+1.6  5.3 
+1.7  3.8 
+1.3  7.8 
+1.5  5.9 
+0.2  4.1 
+1.4  6.2 
+1.0  5.2 Goods 
Services 
including 
income 
excluding 
1ncome 
World  trade  in  goods  and  services 
(Average  annual  growth  rates  1n  f.) 
ANNEX  14 
1970-80  I  1975-80  I 
Revenue  !Expenditure!  Revenue  Expenditure! 
I  I  I 
16.9  I  17.3  I  16.9  17.2  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
investment  16.9  I  16.8  I  18.1  18.9  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
investment  15.2  I  15.3  I  15.3  16.0  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
Source  A.  Herrmann;  W.  Ochel;  M.  Wegner  Wettbewerbsfahigkeit  von 
internationalen Dienstleistungen  in der  E.G.  Feasibility-Study, 
Munich,  July  1985. Regional  breakdown  of  international  trade  in  services 
<including  investment  income  in  /.) 
ANNEX  15 
Revenue  Expenditure 
1970  I  1981  1970  I  1981 
Total  services  100  I  100  100  100 
I 
I 
Industrialized  89.0  I  82.2  78.8  72.6 
countries  I 
I 
Oil-exporting  1. 2  I  5.3  6.9  9.5 
countries  I 
I 
Other  developing  9.7  I  12.5  14.3  17.8 
countries  I 
I 
Source  DIW,  Der  internationale  Handel  mit  Dienstleistungen,  1984. STRUCTURE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  IN  SERVICES, 
BY  CATEGORY  OF  SERVICE 
.  h  1  Fre1g  t 
Other  transport 
Travel 
Investment  income 
Other  public  services 
Other  private services 
Total  services 
Freight1 
Other  transport 
Travel 
Investment  income 
Other  public  services 
Other  private services 
Freight1 
Other  transport 
Travel 
Other  public  services 
Other  private services 
1Including  freight  insurance 
Source  :  DIW 
1970,  1975,  1980  and  1981 
REVENUE  EXPENDITURE 
Accord1ng  According  to  According  to  According  to 
to  IMF(A)  IMF(8)  IMF(A)  IMF(B) 
1970 J  1975  1975  1 19so  1 19st  1970  1  1975  1975  11980  11981 
in  'ODD  ~illion SDRs  . 
12,3  21,4  2Z,9  43,5  47,1  15,5  33,0  31,6  6?,6  69,3 
12,8  27,5  27,4  55,9  65,8  14,7  29. t  29,7  59,4  69,5 
18,5  34,6  35,1  75,7  aj,4  17,9  34,9  35,0  77 ;'l  84,1 
26,3  57·'  57,2  169,5  223,7  28,4  58,5  57,6  177,9  244,3 
7,8  12,6  11,9  22,4  26,1  9,9  14,9  13,3  33,4  38,2 
19,9  44.~  ·47 .o  95,3  107,9  19,0  43,9  43,0  88,4  103,8 
97,6 
I  • 
197;~ ,201,4  463,2  554,5  105,5  214,3  210,2  499,0  609,3 
'  Proportion of all services  Cin  ~) 
12,6  10,~  11,4  9,4  8.6  14 .a  15,4  15,1  12,6  ",4 . 
13,1  13,?  13.6  12,3  ,  ,9  14,0  13~6  14 ·'  ",9  ,  ,4 
19.0  17,5  17,4  16,3  15,0  11,0  16,3  16,7  15,5  13,8 
26,9  28:1}  211,4  36,6  40,3  26,9  27.3  27,4  35,7  40 ·' . 
8,0  6~4  5.9.  4.8  4,7  9,4  7,0  6,3  6,7  ,:  6,3 
20,4  22,5  23,3  20,6  19.5  18,0  20,5  20,4  11,1  17 ·' 
•.  Proportion  of tot  a  l.ser.v~  c~s,..,.exc  lU:~i  !19 .: ii)IIQS tment · i ncol':le  ' 
17,3  .15,2  15,8  14,8  14,4  20,2  21 ,2  20,8  19,5  19,0 
18,0  19,6  19,0  19,4  19,9  19,1  18,7  19,5  18,5  19,0 
25,9  24,6  24,3  25,8  25,2  23,2  22,4  22,9  24,0  23,0. 
10,9  9,0  8,3  7,6  7,9  12,8  9,6  8,7  1(},4  10,5 
l7,9  31.6  32,6  32.4  32.6  24,6  28,2  28,1  27.5  28,5 
- ---·- --
I 
I 
:>  z  z 
m 
X 
_, 
a-ANNEX  17 
~  nl.locatf~ of the outrut of lllJrlc~t  ~rv1c:r Betlv1tles in the F.uropean  Omullty 
(T\lta for 1975  :  ~rcentages) 
Prop:>rtlon of outJUt ftlloc:ated to : 
tw:F 8Ctfvlty runrer  lnte.nrt'rlia~  Int~t"D'6iblt~  Final demrYJ  fXrorts of 
calS\rrpt.Jm by ~fm  hy  by  1btJt1 
irrlus  try  1  cervices  1  hcu;eholds2  housero1ds2 
57  \.'holesale am  17,5  7,7  64,7  10,1  1m,o 
retBH trade 
59  Jndg1fl'. 800  6,7  11,0  82.,3  lfl\0 
eaten~  services 
61  Inl..am  trausiX)rt  34,2  24,9  31,4  9,5  100,0 
63  thrltfne am  19,9  27,0  9,0  43,2  1()"1,0 
Air  trons~rt 
6  7 Cl:ra'l.nicat ion  19,1  45,R  3I,r.  3,1  100,0 
. 69  SerJices of credit am  7,5  73,7  16,2  2,6  100,0 
insurance instltutJcns 
73 Rent il"€  2,1  9,7  R7,3  0,9  •  100,0 
79  Other cervices  22,P  29,1  M,o  4,1  1C1l,O 
Tow- cxx:1u:HTlf  57  and  73  1(),2  34,5  38,7  7,6  100,0 
1bta1 exclu:Jing 73  18,7  26,6  -4(,,4  R,3  1ro,o 
Cram  to~  lf),R  24,6  51,1  7,5  100,0  . 
sorrce  :  F.urostBt  (zusammengestellt  von  MichaelGreen,DG  II).  -
1 In thls e;.'Me  the tenn 1~15try covers dl actfvltie-s except m:rket an:J  ron-mr~t oervices; 
the tenn oervicrs cmrers the  f;IJn  of IIlllrl:et  tmeJ  I'O'l'Tarke t  seTV1 ces 
2 Flnal dencm hy ln.tse'nlds 1nclu:Jes experuitures hy  forefpl tourist& in the  C'll"'..J""fty ANNEX  18 
To~al Private Services: 
Share  in Country's Total Exports  (percentage) 
r 
195~/60  1969/70  1979/80 
I 
Ouelle:  N.  Culton,, a.a.o.,  s.  185/186. 
International  Trade  in Services  and  the  Comparative  Advantage  of  EC 
Countries, ANNEX  19 
1981 
Financenent total  et 005  p:mvoirs  p.lblics de 1a R-D  m  MioEX:U 
Cal.l 
D.I.R.D. 
Col.2. 
R-D  fin. 
Etats 
Col.3 
D.I.R.D./ 
P.I.B. 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Pays  MioEOJ  MioFJ:U  % 
---------------! --------------------------------------------------
Belgique/Belgie  •• !  1267.00  *  542.32  1.48 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Danmark •••••••••• J  552.73  250.17  1.07 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
France  ••••••••••• !  10343.02  6760.35  2.01 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Deutschland •••••• !  15255.58  7057.56  2.48 
-----------------1------------------------------------------------------
Bellas ••••••••••• !  69.03  0.21 
-----------------1------------------------------------------------------
Ireland ..•.......  1  120.11  63.67  o. 75 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Italia  •.•••••.•.. l  3210.42  2060.71  1.01 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Nederlands ••••••• !  2393.79  1251.13  1. 88 
----------~------1------------------------------------------------------
United Kingdom ••• !  11090.02  6443.56  2.42 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
EUR-10 ••••••••••• !  443dl.!t  24498.52  2.00 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Autres donnees  p:>ur  canp:traison 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Japan •••••••••••• !  24380.07  6569.77  2.37 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------ u.s.A •••••••••••• !  65993.10  30216.31  2.51 
-----------------!------------------------------------------------------
Notes:  Col.l=Depense  Interieure Brute de  R-D  (Gouwern.,  Irrlustrie, 
ASLB,  Uni versi  tes > 
Col. 2=R-D  financee  sur les rudgets des  Etats qui canprend  ega-
lerent les depenses  {X)ur  la R-D  ex:ecutee  a  1'  etranger. 
Col.3=Ratio D.I.R.D./P.I.B. 
* estimation nationale 
Source:  Unite des  indicateurs 5-T de  1 'CXDE,  Paris ANNEX  20 
Distribution (\)  of world  semiconductor  consumption  * 
Europe 
Jllp&n 
I u.s.  I 
I 
I 
I 
*  I others  I 
i  I 
I  I 
!  I  ··--· 
* Except 
F~t;tre  2 
I 
X  70  I 
I 
I 
I 
60  ~ 
I 
I 
50  l 
I 
I 
I 
40  1 
I 
I 
I 
30  1 
I 
I 
I 
20  l 
I 
I 
I 
10 I 
I 
I 
1981 
17,6 
19,6 
54,9 
7,9 
100 % 
East 
1982  1983 
17,5  17,3 
20,5  21,1 
53,3  I  52,2 
I 
I 
8,7  I .  9,4 
I 
100%  I  100 % 
tl 
Countries 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
1984 
17,3 
20,7 
51,9 
10,1 
100 % 
u.s. 
Japan 
Europe 
others 
0  L-------~----------------~--------------------
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Source  :  Services  of  the  Commission  of the  European  Communities ANNEX  21 
Distribution  (\)  of world  semiconductor production 
I  1981  I  1982  1983  1981 
I 
I 
•  I 
Europe  I  9  I  8,5  7,9  7,8 
I 
I 
I 
i  Japan  I  24,6  I  26,3  27,8  28,S 
I 
I  I  I 
I  u.s.  I  64,2  I  63,2  62,4  62,2 
-·  ·- ·;  ·- t- ---·~- ...  --,- -I  .. 
. I 
** 
I  I 
I  others  I  2,2  I  2  I  1,9  1,9 
!  I  I  1-' 
100 %  100%  I  100 %  100  ~ 
-'---·· 
*  European  owned  firms 
••  Excopt  East-bloc countries 
Figure  1 
I 
70  ~ 
I 
I 
I 
60  l 
I 
I 
soj 
I 
I 
I 
40  J 
I 
I 
I 
30 1 
I 
I 
I 
20 t 
I 
I 
10 t 
I 
u.s. 
- -· 
Japan 
Europe 
·I  others 
o._-----------------------------------4-----------
1981  ·1982  1983  1984  1985 
Source  z  Serviceo  of the  Commiooion  of  the  European  Communitieo. (1) 
ANNEX  22 
I 
I 
Estimated  robot  population  in  various  countries 
78  -- 80  81  82  •  83  AveragP.  annual  growth,  1980/83 
IFRG  450  1.200  2.300  3.500  4.800  41  X 
IU.K.  125  371  731  1~152  1.753  47  X 
!France  n.a.  580  790  1.385  2.010  36  x 
IIta~  n.a.  400  450  790  1.800  46  X 
TTOrat  n.a.  z.ss1  4.253  6.827  10.363  42  ~ 
!Japan  3.000  6.000  9.500  13.000  16.500  29  ~ 
lu.s.  2.soo  3.5oo  4.soo  6.250  8.ooo  23  ~ 
1  ISw!den  800121.133  1.700  1.300101.90011 
source  :  oeco  ,  Brlt  lSh  Robot  Assoc atlon an"trAS;Oc 7~no;:;-Tr8n"t8r;;c-·Cie.  _  _J 
Robotique  Industrielle 
ANNEX  23 
.,.--------
I 
I 
Number  of  robots  per  10  000  workers  in  ind~stry  CNACE2/4) 
I  1978 
!Federal  Republic  of  Germany  ~ 
!United  Kingdom  0.2 
!France  n.a. 
!Italy  n.a. 
!Japan  2.3 
!United  Statts  1.1 
I  Sweden  7 .B 
lr  (a)  Cornrni  ssion estimate  'for  employment  in 
f  (b)  Not  comparable  with  previous  figures 
1980 
1:4 
0.6 
1.1 
0.7 
4.4 
1.6 
11.0 
1~83. 
1983<a> 
""""6."! 
3.4 
4.1 
3.4 
11.8 
3.9 
20.3(b) 
Csee  preceding  table>. ::. .. htb t  Some reeent and planned US-Japanese joint ventures 
Computer~ 
Coplen. photographic equipment 
Disc pqy.s. air conditioners 
Lightweight plastic: components 
Robots end smell motors 
GM-Tovota 
Ford - \1azda 
Chrysler- Mitsullishi Motors 
IBM- MatsushitJ Electric 
Sperry-Univac- 'iippon U'!ivac 
National SemiCOI'ductor- Httachi 
Honeywell- NEC 
Tandy- Kyolera 
Sperry- M itsub<Sili 
Kodak-Canon 
GE - Matsushita 
Boeing-Mitsub<shi Heaw lndustriM 
- Kawasar:i Heaw •ndustries 
-Fuji Heavy Industries 
Armco-Mitsubistli Rayon 
Bendill-Murau JJ!achinerv Company 
GM- F\Jjitsu Fanvc 
Houda•tle-Okum:a 
Houda"le-Mayeqwa 
Allen Brad lev- tl,.opondel'so 
Westinghouse- <omatsu 
- •.•itsubiSI'• Electric 
IBM-Sanyo Se'ro 
ANNEX  24 
Source  Table  from  "Japan  Inc.,  USA"  by  Robert  Reich  in the  New  Republic 
26  November  1984 Top  200  international  industrial  corporations 
breakdown  ~f activities 1)  2> 
TOTAL 
Activity: 
Petroleum  Refining 
Motor  vehicles  and 
parts 
Chemicals 
Metal  manufacturing 
~1eta l  products 
Electronic 
appliances 
~1ining 
Food  beverages, 
tobacco 
Industrial  + 
farm  equipment 
Pharmaceuticals 
Aerospace 
Office  Equipment  + 
Computers 
Measuring, 
scientific, 
photographic 
equipment 
Other 
EEC 
53 
10 
10 
7 
8 
6 
4 
4 
2 
2 
NON-EEC 
EUROPE 
9 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
USA 
88 
17 
5 
6 
4 
9 
1 
16 
2 
2 
8 
7 
3 
8 
1)  Sources  1.  "FORTUNE"  Magazine  - 29  April  19ES 
2.  "FORTUNE"  Magazine  - 19  August  1985 
JAPAN 
28 
7 
5 
1 
5 
7 
1 
1 
1 
ANl~EX  25 
OTHERS 
22 
11 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2>  Ranking  was  based  on  sales  figures  ranging  from  $ 90.854.000 for n°1 
to  $ 4.231.462  for  n°  200. ANNEX  26 
Capital  gearing  ratio_s  of  companies  calculated from  reported  data 
1970  1975  1980  1981 
France  65  70  70  72 
Germany  63  63  64  65 
Japan  84  85  84  63 
United  Kingdom  52  51  49  49 
United  States  44  37  37  38 
Note  :  OECD  "Non  financial  Entreprises  Financial  Statements"  Financial Statistics 
Part  3  :  calculations  in  National  Westminster  Bank,  Quarterly,  Nov.  1984 
ANNEX  27 
Companies  financial  assets  as  a  percentage of  their total assets 
1970  1975  1980  1981 
France  46  44  47  48 
Germany  38  39  42  42 
Japan  59  58  58  58 
United  Kingdom  34  33  35  36 
United  States  30  27  27  26 
Source  OECD.  "Non-financial  Enterprises  Financial  Statements",  Financial Statistics 
Part 3.  Calculations  in  National  Westminster  Bank  Quarterly  Nov.  1984 
ANNEX  28 
Effective  average  rates of  mainstream  corporation  tax  (1) 
1970  i975  1980  1981 
France  6.4  8.1  8.6  10.5 
Germany  9.0  7.3  7.3  9.7 
Japan  9.3  10.7  12.6  17.8 
United  Kingdom  10.7  19.2  10.1  9.2 
United  States  16.6  20.3  17.5  17.8 
Note  Mainstream  corporation  tax  as  a  percentage of  the  gross  operating  surplus 
of  companies  on  a  national  account  basis.  J.  Kay  and  J.  Sen,  The  Comparative 
burden  of  Business  taxation,  Institute for  fiscal  studies,  Working  paper  45, 
1983 1979 
Etats-Unis  12.00 
Canada  14.00 
Japan  6.25 
Belgique  10.50 
Danemark  11.00 
France  9.50 
Allemagne  6.00 
Italie  15.00 
Pays-Bas  9.50 
Royaume-Uni  17.00 
T A U X  D'  I  N T E R E T  N A T I  0  N A U X 
Taux  d'escompte  de  la Banque  centrale 
(Fin  de  periode,.en pourcentage  annuel) 
1980  1981  1982 
13.00  12.00  8.50 
17.26  14.66  10.26 
7.25  5.50  5.50 
12.00  15.00  11.50 
11.00  11.00  10.00 
9.50  9.50  9.50 
7.50  7.50  5.00 
16.50  19.00  18.00 
8.00  9.00  5.00 
14.00 
Source  :  FMI,  Statistiques financieres  internationales,  Septembre  1985 
1983 
8.50 
10.04 
5.00 
10.00 
7.00 
9.50 
4.00 
17.00 
5.00 
1984 
8.00 
10.16 
5.00 
11.00 
7.00 
9. 5( 
4.50 
16.50 
5.00 
>  z  z 
ITI 
X 
N 
-a ANNEX  30 
Net  national  saving  as  a  percentage  of  GOP 
1973  1979  1983 
EUR  10  15.4  11.2  7.3 
D  16.3  11.7  9.5 
F  16.5  11.6  6.5 
I  14.0  13.2  6.8 
NL  20.2  11 .1  10.2 
8  15.5  9.2  5.2 
L  37.5  38.7 
UK  10.3  8.0  5.2 
IR  14.8  10.3  7.4 
OK  17.2  8.1  5.2 
GR  25.9  18.1  11.0 
ESP  17.2  11.2  7.3 
POR  24.7  27.7 
USA  10.1  7.6  2.2 
JAP  25.5  18.4  16.2 
ANNEX  31 
?ross  fixed  capital  formation  as  a  percentage of  GOP 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
EUR  10  18.2  21.1  20.0  19.2  18.8 
D  21.9  22.8  22.0  20.1  20.7 
F  21.5  21.9  21.3  20.5  19.6 
I  18.8  19.8  20.2  19.0  17.9 
NL  21.0  20.9  19.2  18.3  18.2 
8  20.8  21.3  18.1  17.5  16.1 
L  25.8  27.3  22.9 
UK  15.5  18.1  16.5  16.6  16.5 
IR  31.0  28.7  29.4  26.1  22.8 
OK  21.0  18.8  15.7  16.1  16.2 
GR  25.9  24.3  22.4  20.2  20.5 
ESP  18.9  19.4  20.3  18.5  18.5 
POR  26.4  28.6  30.7 
USA  19.8  18.9  17.8  15.1  16.8 
JAP  32.1  31.9  31.0  29.3  28.4 
Source  National  Accounts  ESA  1960-1983;  EUROSTAT Number of bualneaa failures 
ANNEX  32 
G.B.  ) 
COOO>  · i 
ll 
~~----------------~------~~------------~--------~~Years 
.  11 113  1.975"'  1'111  197~  ~~~~  I%;>  l'l<t.S 
USA  ~lJ  COOO>  · 
18 
lo 
.  lh 
IL RFA  (000)  Jl 
tqg~  Years 
JAPAN 
2.0 
(000) 
'" 
11. 
, 
Ttl!; ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 28, 11185 International Comparison  of the Proportion of Surviving Companies 
C~untry  Japan  United States  . 
Period  1964  - 84  1950  - 72  . 
Status in  First Market  First and Second Market 
1964  Tokyo Stock  Exchange  Tokyo  Stock Exchange 
Survived  399  768  583 
{87.1)  (85.4)  (58.3) 
Acquired  41  67  . 384 
(9.0)  (7.5)  (38.4) 
Liquidated  8  26  19 
( 1.  7)  (2.9)  ( 1.  9) 
Others  10  38  14 
(2.2)  (4.2)  ( 1. 4) 
Total  458  899  1000 
(100)  . ( 100)  (100) 
-- --------
Sources:  For  the  United States;  Dennis c.  Mu~11er, Profits  in the  Long  Run. 
Fdr  the  United  Kingdom;  Douglas  Kuehn,  Takeovers  and  the  Theory  of. the· Firm. 
For  Japan,  Odagi ri, University of  Tsuk~, 1985-
Note:  In parentheses  are percentages. 
United Kingdom 
1957  - 69 
-
-
1826 
(51. 2) 
1740 
(48.8) 
3566 
{100) 
>  z 
z  m 
X 
VI 
VI ANNEX  34 
Gross rate of return oo invested capital, enterprises excl\Xting houai.n3l 
(capital stock_  valued at replaoerrent CXlet) • 
B  D  F  I  NL  ll<  a:2  USA  Japan 
196D-73  10,6  11,6  13,1  8,3  11,6  9,2  10,8  10,2  11,9 
1974  10,3  9,1  11,4  6,5  10,1  5,9  8,6  8,6  8,8 
1975  8,6  8,6  9,6  4,2  8,7  5,0  7,3  8,4  6,5 
1976  8,1  9,6  9,0  4,9  10,1  6,3  7,8  8,8  6,1 
1977  7,7  9,6  8,8  4,3  9,8  6,9  7,9  9,3  5,7 
1978  7,5  10,0  8,7  4,5  9,6  7,1  8,0  9,4  6,3 
1979  7,5  10,3  8,4  5,7  9,0  6,2  8,0  9,1  5,8 
1980  6,9  9,4  7,3  6,2  8,6  5,3  7,3  8,3  5,8 
1981  6,0  8,8  6,2  4,3  8,9  4,9  6,5  8,3  5,2 
1982  6,1  9,1  6,1  4,0  8,7  5,0  6,5  7,4  4,8 
1  Gross operating surplus as  ~ of gross capital ~k,  inprt.ed labour i.ncxme 
of self-enployed assurred to be equal to the per capita labour incxJne of 
enployE;.;;;:,. 
2 Weighted with GOP  at 1975  p.Irchasing power parities. 
Source:  DIW oo behalf of the Mint.stry of &x:n:ml.c Affairo.  (EX:  average -
Carrni.asioo services) 
~ ANNEX  35 
Net  rate  of  return  an  inVented  capital,  enterprises  excllXti.ng  lnlsin;J 
(capital  ot.ock  and  depreciation  neasured  at  replacement  ooet)  (1) 
(%) 
B  D  F  I  NL  UK  EX:  l2}  US1\ 
1960  10,9  16,3  15,3  6,8  14,5  11,4  12,9  7,2 
1961  11,7  13,8  14,2  7,7  12,4  10,8  11,9  7,7 
1962  10,6  12,5  14,2  7,8  11,7  9,1  11,1  9,4 
1963  9,9  11,4  13,7  6,6  10,4  9,7  10,5  10,2. 
1964  11,0  12,3  13,6  5,0  11,0  10,2  10,6  10,6 
1965  11,2  11,9  13,9  6,3  10,7  8,9  10,6  12,3 
1966  9,8  10,7  14,7  8,1  8,7  7,7  10,3  13,0 
1967  9,4  10,0  14,5  8,4  9,2  8,1  10,2  12,4 
1968  10,2  12,3  13,8  10,0  9,9  8,o  11,0  11,7 
1969  11,4  11,5  14,0  11,9  10,0  6,2  10,9  9,8 
1970  12,3  11,0  14,3  9,0  8,7  4,6  9,9  7,5 
1971  11,2  9,9  13,6  5,7  7,4  6,5  9,1  8,3 
1972  11,6  9,6  14,5  6,1  8,1  5,6  9,2  9,1 
1973  12,3  8,9  14,1  5,3  9,1  5,5  8,8  9,9 
1974  10,4  7,3  11,0  3,9  7,8  2,2  6,6  7,4 
1975  7,6  7,0  9,4  0,3  5,6  1,4  5,0  7,2 
1976  ;},2  8,2  7,6  1,4  7,9  3,5  5,7  7,8 
1977  6,4  8,6  7,3  0,5  10,5  4,3  5,9  8,6 
1978  6,2  9,1  7,1  0,8  10,1  4,5  6,0  8,5 
1979  6,0  9,6  6,8  2,9  9,0  2,5  6,0  7,8 
198C  4,8  8,0  5,1  3,6  7,4  2,2  5,2  7,0 
1981  3,3  7,1  3,6  0,6  8,0  1,5  3,9  7,0 
1982  3,5  7,5  3,4  0,3  7,8  1,7  3,9  5,6 
1983  4,0  8,0  3,4  -o,2  8,0  1,7  4,0  5,9 
1984  4,0  8,3  3,4  o,o  9,0  1,7  4,2  6,0 
(1)  Net  operatin;J  surplus  as  \\  of  net  capital  stock  exclu:ti.n;J  lnlsin;J, 
impJted  laOOur  ino::rre  of oe1f-employed  assurred  to be  equal to the per 
oapi  ta  i.no:me  of  onployees.  Depreciation  on  capital  io  neasured  at 
replacement CXlSt. 
(2)  \t1eighted  usin;J  GIP  at 1975  purchasing power parities. 
Sa.lrce  :  DIW  on  behalf of  the Ministry of  Ecaxmi.c  Affairs  (E1:  average  -
Cbmmission oervices). ANNEX  36 
Total  aiza  of venture capital  funde  available  in the  Europaan  Community 
(December  1984) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Frnnce 
Cormany 
Creece 
Ireland 
Iu.ly 
Luxembourg 
Netherland• 
United Kinadoa 
~00 i 
MECll'S 
0 
MECU  -
96 
96 
163 
314 
22 
49 
172 
11 
740 
3. 708 
5.371 
~···· 
• 
D  DK  f  GE  OR  IR  IT 
crutTRIES 
L 
3700 
E 
740 
Source  Peat Marwick  Mitchell  &  Co  "Venture  Capital  in  Europe  1985"  Brussels 
August,  1985 ••ntura eapital in the  European  Co  1  _  _  bun ty 
Sourcea  of eapital:  inveatora  • 
CORPORATE 
INVESTMS 
PUBLIC 
INVESTOOS 
ANNEX  37 
~17m~.._  UNIVERSITIES (0.1 'l) . 
PEHSleli FlH>S 
INSmAHCf 
CClr'P.AHI£S 
STOCK MARKET 
• 
Sources  of  capital:  geographical  analysis 
Source 
90 
70 
60 
20 
10 
0 
OMS  TIC 
9.6" 
F~IGN 
££C OOJGIN 
Q.OX 
Fa:<EIGN 
NC»f·£EC 
CRJGIH 
Pea~ Marwick  Mitchell  & Co  "Venture  Capital  in  Europe  1985"  Brussels 
August  1985 COUNTRY 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
5~r9E~En_fg~~~ni!i~~1 
* 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United  Kingdom 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
Korea 
New  Zealand 
USA 
1981  - 1982 
Industrial  Unrest 
Average  annual  number 
of  working  days  lost 
per  1000  workers, 
1981-1983 
115.4 
91.1 
1.5 
n.a. 
388.4 
696.8 
24.0  * 
152.1 * 
381.3 
224.3* 
0.5 
228.6* 
54.0 
19.5 
0.6 
421.0 
598.1 
9.4 
1.  2 
224.6* 
*  54.2 
Source  ILO  Statistics  Department;  Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics  1983; 
Bulletin of  Labour  Statistics - February  1984. 
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